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I. AN APPROACH TO DEFINITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM
HIS paper, as a contribution to the symposium entitled Public In-
ternational Law and the Future World Order conducted under the
auspices of the Southern Methodist University School of Law in
March 1984, considers a special but enormously important segment of the
relations among states and the prospects for greater order in those rela-
tions. The subject matter of these relations is monetary in character and
can be distinguished, therefore, from all other relations, although the word
"monetary" is not free from ambiguity.
A question that arises immediately is whether monetary relations among
states are conducted according to rules, principles, or practices that consti-
tute an international monetary system. It might be objected that the ques-
tion as formulated in this way is tendentious because even in the absence
of rules there will be practices, and, further, because the absence of rules
implies a principle, even if it is a principle of freedom from constraint.
The question has to be discussed because the expression "international
monetary system" is now a term of art in legal provisions. Within the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the first important legal instrument
in which the term was incorporated was the decision of the IMF called the
General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB).' The decision was adopted by
the IMF on January 5, 1962, and became effective on October 24, 1962, as
an agreement between the IMF and ten participants, of which eight were
leading industrial members of the IMF and two were the central banks of
two other such members. The ten participants agreed to consider requests
by the IMF to borrow from them to supplement its resources to forestall or
cope with an impairment of the international monetary system in what
Copyright 1984 Sir Joseph Gold.
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1. J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 223-27, 448-62 (1979). For a discussion of the legal character of
the GAB, including the question of agreements to agree in international law, see id at 452-
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were then the new conditions of the convertibility of currencies and greater
freedom for exchange markets.
The expression "the international monetary system" received greater le-
gal importance when it was included in the Articles of Agreement of the
IMF for the first time by the Second Amendment, which became effective
on April 1, 1978. The term, which appears in various provisions, is not
defined by the Articles or in any decision of the IMF. The principal func-
tion of the expression is to refer to the relations among states that are
within the IMF's field of interest under its power to supervise the manage-
ment and supervision of the international monetary system.2
The status of the expression as a term of art led me, in lectures delivered
at the Academy of International Law at The Hague in 1982, to consider
the interrelationships among the concept of the international monetary
system, the IMF, and international monetary law. 3 Some of the ideas ad-
vanced in those lectures are summarized in the next paragraphs, with some
additional reflections, as an introduction to the present paper.
Some writers, usually economists, have attempted to define, or to de-
marcate the terrain of, the international monetary system. One tendency
has been to list the normative elements, but this approach does not arrive
at a principle that unifies the elements or distinguishes the category of in-
ternational relations that are the subject matter of a system composed of
these elements from other international relations. Moreover, a list of the
normative elements is unsatisfactory as a definition because the elements
change from time to time. The changes can be the inclusion or exclusion
of elements or modifications in them. An example of the inclusion of a
new element in the system is the power conferred on the IMF by the First
Amendment of the Articles, which took effect on July 28, 1969, to create
reserve assets in the form of SDRs (special drawing rights) for allocation to
members. An example of exclusion is the elimination of gold from the role
of primary reserve asset in the system by the Second Amendment. The
radical changes in the norms relating to exchange rates are an example of
change in a continuing element of the system, namely, international con-
cern with exchange rates.
Some authors have concentrated on the objectives or qualities of the
international monetary system, or on the problems that it should solve.
These authors make useful contributions to clarification, but these efforts
also are open to the criticism that they do not provide a principle by which
to isolate the relations among countries that are the subject matter of the
system.
2. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Sched. D, para. 2(a)
(unless otherwise stated, all references to provisions are to the present Articles of Agreement
of the IMF) [hereinafter cited as Articles of Agreement]. See also Resolution No. 29-8 of the
IMF's Board of Governors, Oct. 2, 1974, para. 3, reprinted in 10 SELECTED DECISIONS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 346-47 (1983) [herein-
after cited as SELECTED DECISIONS].
3. Developments in the International Monetary System, The International Monetary
Fund, and International Monetary Law Since 1971, 174 RECUEIL DES COURS 107 (1982).
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A better approach to a definition focuses on relations through national
balances of payments and holds that the system is composed of the rules
governing these relations. The monetary authorities, which consist of the
Treasury, central bank, stabilization fund, or other fiscal agency, are nor-
mally in charge of the relations.4 Each of these agencies may have author-
ity under its national law to conduct part of or all the international
monetary relations of its country.
An alternative but similar approach to a definition is that the interna-
tional monetary system consists of the rules that relate to the adjustment or
financing of the balances of payments. The rules include those that mone-
tary authorities are legally bound, or consider themselves morally bound,
to observe to prevent or eliminate a condition of the balance of payments
that cannot be sustained without undesirable consequences.
Either of the approaches as described above represents an intermediate
position between two extreme views. At one extreme is the view that the
international monetary system consists of all the rules and practices that
apply to the transactions of both monetary authorities and private parties
that affect the balance of payments. At the other extreme is the view that
the international monetary system consists solely of those rules affecting
the balance of payments that monetary authorities have undertaken to ob-
serve by international agreement in the strict sense.
The view that is intermediate between these two extremes is cogent be-
cause it is inconceivable that the IMF could exercise supervision over the
management and adaptation of the rules and practices according to which
monetary authorities and private parties conduct their multitudinous activ-
ities across national boundaries. The other extreme view would lead to
equally impractical results. It would exclude, for example, agreements be-
tween central banks, which, according to some theories of international
law, are not international agreements in the same sense as treaties. Yet,
agreements between central banks have profound effects on international
monetary relations and sometimes are entered into by the central banks
because they have the authority to do so under existing legal provisions.
The decisions that they should enter into agreements may be taken, how-
ever, by the Treasury on behalf of the national Executive. Furthermore,
the extreme view considered here would cast doubt, again according to
some conceptions, on whether agreements by countries to collaborate, con-
sider, or consult on monetary matters are part of the international mone-
tary system because of the imprecision or subjectivity of these obligations.5
The intermediate view means that the international monetary system
consists of a complex of relationships among countries on matters affecting
the adjustment or financing of the balance of payments that are governed
by rules and understandings that are more extensive than international
monetary law as a branch of public international law. Nevertheless, public
international law, principally in the treaty form, is now at the heart of the
4. Articles of Agreement, Art. V, § 1.
5. J. GOLD, supra note 1, at 446-68.
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international monetary system. An implication of the intermediate view is
that the rules and understandings are taken seriously by countries, and
that if countries fail to observe the rules and understandings there will be
some response even if it consists only of censure. Another implication may
be that an international organization at the center of the system is neces-
sary to administer the main rules. There is such an organization, the IMF.
It is itself part of the system. Its law and the law governing the monetary
functions of other international organizations are part of international
monetary law.
II. AN APPROACH TO THE IDEA OF ORDER IN THE SYSTEM
If the Future World Order means the future of order in the world, how
shall order in the international monetary system be understood? Order
can be taken to mean the realization-or at least a close approximation to
it-of the purposes to which most countries have subscribed by becoming
members of the IMF. Article I of the IMF's Articles is the most elaborate
formulation of these purposes. The provision was the product of intensive
negotiation before and 4t the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944 at
which the Articles were drafted. Article I has remained intact, with only
slight modifications that did not affect substance on the occasion of the
First Amendment. The longevity of Article I is remarkable in view of the
profound changes that have occurred in the international monetary
system.
The purposes of the IMF refer to an international monetary organiza-
tion, the expansion and growth of international trade, stability and equity
in the exchanges, the convertibility of currencies, the availability of re-
sources to give members the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their
balances of payments, and limitation of the period and intensity of dise-
quilibria in balances of payments. No paraphrase can give an adequate
impression of Article I, in which the purposes are formulated as follows:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a per-
manent institution which provides the machinery for consulta-
tion and collaboration on international monetary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of interna-
tional trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and
to the development of the productive resources of all members
as primary objectives of economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive ex-
change depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of pay-
ments in respect of current transactions between members and
in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which ham-
per the growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources
of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safe-
[Vol. 38
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guards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct malad-
justments in their balance of payments without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of
payments of members. 6
When the original proposals for a currency plan that ultimately took the
form of the Articles was under discussion, the British experts led by John
Maynard Keynes advocated a plan, Proposals for an International Clear-
ing Union, under which the international organization to be created would
have issued an international monetary reserve asset ("bancor") to partici-
pating countries. 7 The U.S. experts feared that the United States, as the
country most likely to be in surplus in its balance of payments, would have
to accept an unduly large proportion of bancor in settlement for the real
resources it would be providing. The United States, preferring a limited
and certain exposure, was successful in achieving this aim in the form of
an obligation to make a defined subscription.8
In the Sixties a widespread conviction developed that the international
monetary system was threatened by a dilemma in which one horn was the
continued addition of a surfeit of U.S. dollars to the monetary reserves of
other countries as a result of deficits in the balance of payments of the
United States and the other horn was a shortage of monetary reserves with
which to ensure growth in international activity if the deficits were curbed
or ceased. The world returned to the idea of a monetary reserve asset, the
SDR, that could be allocated by the IMF to its members. This develop-
ment was the most important one that had occurred since Bretton Woods,
but the objectives that were to be served were not included among the
purposes in Article I. The difficulty with which that provision had been
negotiated originally discouraged the amendment of it. In addition, the
6. Articles of Agreement, Art. I.
7. (a) We need an instrument of international currency having general accept-
ability between nations, so that blocked balances and bilateral clearings are
unnecessary; that is to say, an instrument of currency used by each nation in
its transactions with other nations, operating through whatever national or-
gan, such as a Treasury or a Central Bank, is most appropriate, private indi-
viduals, businesses and banks other than Central Banks, each continuing to
use their own national currency as heretofore.
(c) We need a quantum of international currency, which is neither deter-
mined in an unpredictable and irrelevant manner as, for example, by the
technical progress of the gold industry, nor subject to large variations de-
pending on the gold reserve policies of individual countries; but is governed
by the actual current requirements of world commerce, and is also capable of
deliberate expansion and contraction to offset deflationary and inflationary
tendencies in effective world demand.
3 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965: TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY COOPERATION, 20 (J. Horsefield ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as J. HORSEFIELD].
8. Furthermore, a member's quota could be adjusted--subscription was equal to
quota-only with the consent of the member, and the provision requiring consent could be
amended only with the acceptance of all members. These provisions of the original Articles
remain in the present Articles as Article III, § 2(d) and Article XXVIII(b).
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provisions relating to the SDR were included in what was really a new and
discrete chapter added to the Articles so as to disturb the original provi-
sions as little as possible.9 The statement of a new purpose could not be
avoided, but it was included, in the following form, in the new chapter:
In all its decisions with respect to the allocation and cancellation of
special drawing rights the Fund shall seek to meet the long-term
global need, as an when it arises, to supplement existing reserve as-
sets in such manner as will promote the attainment of its purposes and
will avoid economic stagnation and deflation as well as excess de-
mand and inflation in the world.10
This provision is drafted in both teleological and normative language.
The Seventies saw the collapse of the par value system that had been
established by the original Articles and the adoption of the Second
Amendment as a consequence. The revised Articles contain language that
formulates a purpose of the international monetary system. The purpose is
not drafted as a purpose of the IMF, so to avoid a normative principle
from which the Fund could draw regulatory jurisdiction over members,"I
in contrast to the provision of the First Amendment, quoted above, which
was drafted as a normative direction. Once again, the new provision was
not included in Article I. The pertinent language of the Second Amend-
ment is as follows:
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary
system is to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of
goods, services, and capital among countries, and that sustains sound
economic growth, and that a principal objective is the continuing de-
velopment of the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for
financial and economic stability .... 12
By avoiding a normative formulation, the drafters were able to express a
purpose of great breadth. It embraces, for example, the exchange of goods,
services, and capital, over which the IMF does not have regulatory juris-
diction. The argument for considering the language as indicative of a pur-
pose of the IMF is that the provision sets forth an "essential purpose of the
international monetary system" and the IMF is charged with the duty to
"oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective
operation,"' 3 in addition to the function of supervising the management
and adaptation of the international monetary system.' 4 The duty to over-
see the system so as to ensure its effective operation is strong language, but
as of the date of this paper no attempt has been made to explore what
authority this duty confers on the IMF. 15
9. J. GOLD, supra note 1, at 128-47.
10. Articles of Agreement, Art. XVIII, § 1.
11. See generally Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrange-
ments, 177 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1983).
12. Articles of Agreement, Art. IV, § 1.
13. Id. Art. IV, § 3(a).
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15. Although the duty is set forth in Article IV, § 3(a), and Article IV is headed "Obli-
gations Regarding Exchange Arrangements," Article IV, § 3(a) is formulated so as to
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III. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
The original Articles of Agreement of the IMF, which were drafted at
the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944 and became effective on De-
cember 27, 1945, were the first multilateral charter for the regulation of the
international monetary system. The Agreement is a treaty among coun-
tries that provides for their membership in the IMF. The Articles were not
the first treaty on monetary matters. For example, during the First World
War, the U.S. Congress, in the exercise of its banking and currency power,
passed the Second Liberty Bond Act to authorize the U.S. Administration
to make arrangements with foreign countries during a limited period to
stabilize foreign exchange and to obtain foreign currencies. 16 Under the
same congressional power, the U.S. Administration was authorized by the
Gold Reserve Act to deal in gold and foreign exchange for the purpose of
stabilizing the exchange value of the U.S dollar, without limitation on the
period during which agreements might be entered into under this
authority. 17
The latter statute was the authority under which the United States exe-
counteract the impression that the provision is confined to exchange arrangements: "The
Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective opera-
tion, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations under Section 1
of this Article." Articles of Agreement, Art IV, § 3(a). The first part of this sentence would
be unnecessary if it did not add something to the second part. This interpretation is not
nullified by the first sentence of Article IV, § 3(b): "In order to fulfill its functions under (a)
above, the Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members,
and shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to these
policies." This sentence does not declare that firm surveillance over the exchange rate poli-
cies of members and the adoption of specific principles are sufficient to enable the IMF to
fulfill its functions under § 3(a). This analysis is accepted in the IMF's decision of April 29,
1977 ("Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies"), which contains the following sentence:
"They [the principles and procedures set forth in the decision] do not deal directly with the
Fund's responsibilities referred to in Section 3(a), although it is recognized that there is a
close relationship between domestic and international economic policies." SELECTED DECI-
SIONS, supra note 2, at 11. This sentence is then supported by the quotation of the "Recog-
nizing" clause in Article IV, § 1. Id.; see also Young, Surveillance over exchange ratepolicies,
14 F N. & DEV., Sept. 1977, at 17, 18 (discussing principles and procedures for surveillance
over exchange rate policies).
16. [T]he Secretary of the Treasury may, during the war and for two years after
its termination, make arrangements in or with foreign countries to stabilize
the foreign exchanges and to obtain foreign currencies and credits in such
currencies, and he may use any such credits and foreign currencies for the
purpose of stabilizing or rectifying the foreign exchanges, and he may desig-
nate depositaries in the foreign countries with which may be deposited as he
may determine all or any part of the avails of any foreign credits or foreign
currencies.
Supplement to the Second Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65-217, 40 Stat. 965, 966 (1918). A
number of agreements were made under this authority, including agreements with Argen-
tina, Bolivia, and Peru.
17. Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337 (1934) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). By 1945, bilateral agreements
had been entered into with Brazil, China, Ecuador, Iceland, and Mexico. Hearings before
the Committee on Banking and Currency, US Senate, 79th Congress, 1st Session, on HR.
3314, an Act to providefor the participation ofthe United States in the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bankfor Reconstruction and Development, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
540 (1945).
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cuted the Tripartite Currency Stabilization Agreement of 1936 by means
of bilateral agreements with France and the United Kingdom. Later, the
Netherlands and Switzerland adhered to the principles of the agreement. 18
The importance of the stabilization agreements, and particularly the Tri-
partite Agreement, is that they were in the mind of Harry Dexter White of
the U.S. Treasury,' 9 the official who, with colleagues, in the early Forties
produced the Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for an International
Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations.20
Both Keynes and White were aware that their plans, if accepted, would
introduce innovations of radical importance in international law. Pub-
lished records show how concerned Keynes was with such questions as the
degree of sovereignty that states should be willing to forgo in monetary
matters. 21 The tradition of centuries had been that these matters were ex-
clusively within the jurisdiction of each state, and that states were entitled
to act unilaterally whatever the impact might be on others. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that Keynes paid much attention to the division between
the authority that each member should retain and the authority that all
members should concede to a new international organization. Both
Keynes22 and White 23 discussed the justification for surrendering authority
18. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY EXPERIENCE: LESSONS OF THE
INTER-WAR PERIOD 131, 147, 157-58 (1944); K. DAM, RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND
EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 49 (1982).
19. 1 J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 7, at 6-10; LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 18, at 141
("It ought to be an elementary principle of international monetary relations that exchange
rates should not be altered by arbitrary unilateral action. The Tripartite Agreement was a
belated and half-hearted admission of this principle.").
20. Entitled in an earlier version Preliminary Draft Proposalfor a United Nations Stabi-
lization Fund and a Bankfor Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated
Nations. See 3 J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 7, at 37-96.
21. 25 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: ACTIVITIES 1940-
1944, SHAPING THE POST-WAR WORLD: THE CLEARING UNION, 161, 308-14, 317 (D. Mog-
gridge ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 25 KEYNES].
22. 49. It has been suggested that so ambitious a proposal is open to criticism
on the ground that it requires from the members of the Currency Union
a greater surrender of their sovereign rights than they will readily
concede.
50. But, in the present version of the plan, no greater surrender is required
than in any commercial treaty-certainly not greater than in the bind-
ing undertakings against discrimination which the United States is in-
viting us to make. The obligations will be entered into voluntarily and
can be terminated on certain conditions by giving notice.
51. In the second place a greater readiness to accept super-national ar-
rangements must be required in the post-war world than hitherto. The
arrangements proposed could be described as a measure of Financial
Disarmament. They are very mild in comparison with the measures of
Military Disarmament, which it is to be hoped the world may be asked
to accept.
52. Surely it is an advantage, rather than a disadvantage, of the scheme that
it invites the member States and groups to abandon that licence to pro-
mote indiscipline, disorder and bad-neighbourliness which, to the gen-
eral disadvantage, they have been free to exercise hitherto.
53. There is nothing here which we need be reluctant to accept ourselves or
to ask of others. Or if there be anything such, let it be amended.
3 J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 7, at 13-14.
23. See infra Appendix A.
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to an external entity.
Keynes discussed other issues of interest to international lawyers then
and now. For example, how much of the authority of the new interna-
tional organization should be the subject of precise rules and how much
should be left to its discretion?24 What was the value of the right of with-
drawal by a member from the organization?25
IV. ORIGINAL ARTICLES
The Articles of Agreement that emerged from the Bretton Woods Con-
ference were largely in accordance with the preferences of the United
States. The U.S. and the British prenatal plans agreed that a code of obli-
gations to govern international monetary relations should be instituted,
and that the countries that became members of the IMF should contribute
to a pool of resources on which members facing balance of payments diffi-
culties could draw. Balance of payments difficulties could be overcome
within the short to medium term and were said to be "temporary."
Longer-term difficulties were problems of reconstruction and development
and were to fall within the competence of the World Bank. The resources
of the IMF were to be available to enable a member to solve its balance of
payments problem without following policies or adopting measures that
were inconsistent with the obligations in the code of conduct. This combi-
nation of regulatory authority and financial resources is still unique among
multilateral international organizations.
Keynes and White agreed that a central monetary organization must
have authority over exchange rates. The appropriate exchange rate for a
member's currency was crucial if disequilibrium in the member's balance
of payments was to be avoided or eliminated. Regulatory authority over
exchange rates raised the issue of the surrender of sovereignty that con-
cerned them both. White supported somewhat more authority for the or-
ganization than Keynes was willing to concede. The provisions of the
Articles on par values on which agreement was reached included com-
promises that in some important aspects favored the view of Keynes that a
member should retain substantial authority over the external value of its
currency.
Keynes and White differed more sharply on the resources that were to
be available to facilitate observance of the code of conduct. As noted
above, Keynes wanted the organization to be able to create resources,
while White wished to limit the resources to those that would be sub-
scribed by members. White wanted the organization to be able to borrow
if it needed to augment its subscribed resources, but the organization
would have to find a willing lender. The concurrence of the member that
24. See infra Appendix B.
25. 3 J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 7, at 20; see also Gold, Keynes on Legal Problems of
Internaional Organization, 14 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1981) (discussing Keynes's views on the
problems of establishing of an international economic system).
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issued the currency to be borrowed would have to be obtained if the mem-
ber itself was not the lender. The U.S. approach on subscribed and bor-
rowed resources prevailed. The power to borrow has had an increasingly
important function in the IMF's activities, partly because quotas have been
too low. The power has given Managing Directors the legal basis on
which to rely in proposing new departures in the IMF's activities to meet
new problems.
Even after the Bretton Woods Conference there remained a difference of
opinion on the use of the IMF's resources that was related to considera-
tions of sovereignty. According to the British view, a member should be
able to use the IMF's resources automatically, which meant without chal-
lenge by the IMF, unless the member wanted to draw from the pool an
abnormal amount in proportion to its quota. The U.S. view was that a
member's right to use the IMF's resources was always subject to scrutiny
and could be challenged for good cause. The U.S. position prevailed and
led in time to the doctrine of conditionality, which requires a member to
satisfy the IMF that the use of its resources will be in accordance with its
purposes.
The par value system, which was at the heart of the IMF's regulatory
jurisdiction, recognized that exchange rates were matters of international
concern. Therefore, exchange rates should be subjected to international
examination and should carry international endorsement. Each member
had to establish a par value for its currency in terms of gold, or in terms of
a U.S. dollar of fixed gold content, which had the same effect. The option
existed because, under the laws of some countries, the external value of the
currency was defined in relation to the U.S. dollar. Gold was the common
denominator of the par value system because of the traditional acceptabil-
ity of gold and its function as a monetary reserve asset. The agreement of
the IMF was necessary for the initial par value that was established under
the Articles, and the concurrence of the IMF had to be obtained for a
change of par value. The word "concurrence" was intended to imply that
the IMF would lean in favor of a proposed change. To promote exchange
stability, a change was justified only if it was necessary to correct a funda-
mental disequilibrium.
In accordance with the underlying legal principle that each member is
responsible for its own currency under the Articles, each member was re-
quired to maintain the effectiveness of the par value of its currency as es-
tablished under the Articles. This obligation was expressed in operational
terms by requiring each member to take appropriate measures consistent
with the Articles to ensure that spot exchange transactions in the member's
territories were carried out at exchange rates within the narrow margins
defined by the Articles. These margins were around the "parity," i.e. the
ratio derived from the par values of the two currencies that were the sub-
ject of the exchange transaction. 6 The IMF had no authority to approve a
26. A member's obligation was based on an apparent territorial view of jurisdiction, but
the provision raised the question of the territory or territories in which exchange transactions
[Vol. 38
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member's withdrawal of support for the par value of its currency. Floating
was a heinous retreat to disorder. A member had only the option of
changing an unsupportable par value to one that it could maintain, and
even an interval of floating was illegal.
The United States did not wish to police its exchange markets to make
sure that exchange rates for the U.S. dollar were within the defined mar-
gins. It negotiated a provision at the Bretton Woods Conference that enti-
tled, but did not compel, a member to follow a particular practice that was
deemed to be an appropriate measure on exchange rates.27 The practice
was the readiness of a member to buy and sell gold for its own currency in
transactions requested by the monetary authorities of other members, at
prices compatible with the par value of the currency. The theory of the
provision was that a member following the practice was taking reasonable
action to maintain the external value of its currency in terms of gold as the
common denominator of the par value system. If exchange transactions
involving the currency occurred at exchange rates outside the margins for
exchange transactions imposed by the Articles, the responsibility could be
attributed to the failure of other members to engage in gold transactions
with the member that was prepared to enter into them. These transactions
would enable a member that requested them to intervene in its exchange
market to support the exchange rate for its currency in relation to the cur-
rency convertible into gold. The member supported its currency by buying
or selling the gold-convertible currency in exchange for its own currency.
The gold-convertible currency could be obtained or disposed of for gold in
transactions with the issuer of that currency.
It was apparent at Bretton Woods that only the United States would
have the resources to engage in gold transactions under the provision it
had negotiated. The United States may have assumed that the strength of
its prospective balance of payments would not result in substantial out-
flows of gold. The only member that did purport to engage in gold trans-
actions in support of its currency under the provision was the United
States.
Certain consequences followed from the declaration by the United
States that it was prepared to follow the practice. First, this undertaking
by the United States became the foundation of the par value system in
fact, because the undertaking enabled other members to refrain from en-
gaging in gold transactions. Instead, members could retain their holdings
of U.S. dollars for investment, using them to intervene in exchange mar-
take place. Article XI of the original Articles, which remains substantially unchanged in the
present Articles, dealt with exchange transactions in the territories of nonmembers. The
provision imposes obligations on a member itself to refrain from certain conduct in the
territories of nonmembers and to apply in its own territories measures to prevent transac-
tions in nonmember territory that would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Articles
or the purposes of the IMF. Article XI is difficult to understand and on one occasion gave
rise to considerable controversy. I J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 7, at 405.




kets when necessary to manage exchange rates. Members could earn inter-
est by investment with the assurance that gold was available on demand if
they wished to add gold to their reserves. Moreover, members could be
confident that the U.S. economy would be so well managed and so strong
that there would be no prospect of a devaluation of the dollar and, there-
fore, no risk of loss as a result of holding dollars. This confidence was
based not entirely on faith because the privilege of members to call for
gold could have a disciplinary influence on the United States.
Second, the undertaking assured members of symmetry in the interna-
tional monetary system. Symmetry in the treatment of groups of countries
perceived to be in different situations in the international monetary system
was a principle of the system even if the principle was not made explicit
until more recent times. 28 The United States was obviously different from
all other members in the international monetary system because of the way
in which the par value system operated and for other reasons. Symmetry
existed in the structure of the par value system in theory because other
members intervened in the exchange markets with their holdings of U.S.
dollars, or currencies convertible into dollars, while the United States
would provide gold to other members, on demand, in the comprehensive
settlement of international transactions. Both the United States and other
members would use reserve assets in support of the exchange rates for their
currencies. 29
For lawyers, it may seem remarkable that the par value system rested in
reality on a voluntary undertaking by the United States. The situation
recalls the philosophical theory that a legal system rests on a norm that is
outside the system in the sense that it is not prescribed by the system. The
undertaking became the fundamental norm of the international monetary
system because of the assumption that the strength and stability of the U.S.
economy would be maintained.
A second consequence of the par value system in operation was the pas-
sivity of the U.S. monetary authorities in the exchange markets. This pas-
sivity was authorized by the provision on gold transactions, but Keynes
28. Gold, Symmetry as a Legal Objective of the International Monetary System, 12 N.Y.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 423, 428-29 (1980).
29. In time, the United States would object that the system did not assure it of symme-
try for various reasons. For example, when the United States was in deficit in its balance of
payments, it would lose gold to other members, but they did not provide gold to the United
States when they were in deficit. Instead, they transferred dollars to the United States, or, in
other words, cancelled its currency liabilities, which did not provide it with additions to its
monetary reserves. Second, the United States could be called on for gold, even though it
was not in deficit in its balance of payments, because the member tendering dollar balances
for conversion with gold was in surplus with other members. To cure these flaws, the con-
cept of "asset settlement," in lieu of the former convertibility, evolved during the attempt to
reform the international monetary system after the collapse of the par value system. INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: A
REPORT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 31-40 (1972); CoM-
MITTEE ON REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND RELATED ISSUES,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM: DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY
(1974) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS OF COMMITTEE OF TWENTY].
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was distressed immediately after the B retton Woods Conference at the
prospect that the United States would not take other action to prevent the
depreciation of sterling in the U.S. exchange market. Keynes exhorted the
U.S. authorities, without success, to adopt legislation that would make ex-
change rates outside the prescribed margins illegal in the United States.30
An irony of international monetary history is that the provision Keynes
found objectionable because it permitted passivity by the United States
was the basis of the complaint by the United States almost three decades
later that it suffered fundamental disadvantages in the system.
Later, the principle was expounded that in any orderly system of ex-
change rates in which there were n currencies, there would be n-1 exchange
rates. The theory justified passivity, because if the United States pursued
an active exchange rate policy, the result might be conflict between that
policy and the exchange rate policies of other members. It was possible,
however, as practice demonstrated from time to time, to coordinate inter-
vention by the United States and other members in exchange markets in
support of a common policy. The argument in support of passivity sup-
poses that there would be circumstances in which exchange rate policies
were inconsistent and could not be reconciled.
The par value system operated successfully in producing an environ-
ment in which international economic activity flourished, but there were
flaws that contributed to a faltering and then a collapse of the system. Re-
peated deficits in the U.S. balance of payments shook confidence in the
dollar. Members did not propose the prompt changes in the par values of
their currencies that would avoid maladjustment in their balances of pay-
ments. The IMF had no legal authority to propose a change. Many other
flaws, some but not all of which were inherent in the legal structure of the
par value system, can be added to the roster of weaknesses that led to
collapse.
For some years before the fall of the par value system, however, symme-
try had ceased to exist. As confidence in the dollar ebbed and the U.S.
stock of gold was reduced progressively by conversions of dollar balances,
the United States adopted one technique after another to offer other bene-
fits that would discourage conversions. The realization grew that conver-
sions were economically inopportune because they might shatter the
structure of the par value system and were politically inopportune because
they might arouse the ire of the United States. The undertaking of the
United States to engage in official gold transactions was not challenged as
the fundamental norm by the IMF or by other members, even though the
undertaking had become a legal fiction. The experience demonstrated that
an international monetary system can be created on the basis of a legal
fiction, unless that fiction is repudiated by the actors in the system. The
Smithsonian Agreement was a further demonstration of this possibility be-
30. 26 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: ACTIVITIES 1941-
1946, SHAPING THE POST-WAR WORLD, BRETTON WOODS AND REPARATIONS 142-43 (D.
Moggridge ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 26 KEYNES].
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cause the understandings on new par values for the currencies of the par-
ties were accompanied by no promise of the United States to convert
official holdings of dollars or to intervene in the exchange market. On
August 15, 1971, it was the United States that implicitly repudiated the
legal fiction.
An objective of the par value system was fixed and stable, but not rigid,
exchange rates. Among the other objectives of the provisions on exchange
rates were the avoidance of multiple currency practices, discriminatory
currency arrangements, 31 and competitive exchange alterations. 32 These
provisions were of particular interest to the United States. The order that
would be achieved if the purposes of the IMF were realized would benefit
all members, including the United States, but that country saw itself as the
most likely victim if disorderly practices, such as discrimination and com-
petitive devaluation, were resorted to in the disturbed conditions that
would follow the Second World War. The role of the IMF in eliminating
and preventing these practices was a special benefit for the United States.
Self-interest does not preclude altruism: the mixture is often called en-
lightened self-interest. The United States agreed, for example, that mem-
bers would be able to maintain existing discriminatory practices, and to
adapt them, under transitional arrangements. Moreover, the United States
even proposed the so-called "scarce currency clause" that would enable
other members to introduce discrimination against a member if the IMF
found that the member's currency was scarce. 33
Roy Harrod's biography of Keynes should be read if the impact of the
U.S. proposal on British officials is to be grasped. Here is a brief extract
that recalls Harrod's reaction as he first read the draft in the dim light and
crowded conditions of a wartime train in February 1943:
I could not believe my eyes or my brain. I read it again and
again. . . . I was transfixed. This, then, was the big thing. For years
we had complained of the United States' attitude as a creditor. For
months we had struggled in vain to find some formula which would
pin them down to a share of responsibility. Now they had come for-
ward and offered a solution of their own, gratuitously. This was cer-
tainly a great event. For it was the first time that they had said in a
document, unofficial, it was true, and non-commital, but still in a con-
sidered Treasury document, that they would come in and accept their
full share of responsibility when there was a fundamental dise-
quilibrium of trade.34
Even so, the final version of the clause was strengthened, and again the
initiative was taken by the United States.35
The importance for the British was not the expectation that the clause
31. Articles of Agreement, Art. VIII, § 3 (original Articles).
32. Id. Art. I(iii); Id Art. IV, § 4(a) (original Articles).
33. Id. Art. VII, § 3 (original Articles).
34. R. HARROD, THE LIFE OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, 544-45 (1951). For the full
account, see id at 543-48.
35. Id. at 565, 571-72.
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would be invoked against the United States, but that the principle noted by
Harrod was acknowledged. The expectation was that the United States
would take steps to avoid a severe "dollar shortage." This expectation was
realized: the clause has never been applied even though it has remained in
the Articles throughout the three versions. U.S. policies were those of a
good creditor, so that there was no justification for relying on a clause that
authorized an action considered to be a sanction. It is true, however, that
the transitional arrangements reduced any disposition to apply the clause,
because they authorized the maintenance and adaptation of restrictions,
including discriminatory restrictions.
The multilateral system, or market convertibility as it has been called
sometimes, was another major feature of the regulatory jurisdiction of the
IMF under the original Articles. Members not availing themselves of the
transitional arrangements were to avoid restrictions on the making of pay-
ments and transfers for current international transactions, 36 so that what
was earned in these transactions in one country could be used in payments
for transactions in other countries. The Articles recognized that members
retained the authority to control capital movements.37 The damaging ef-
fects of movements of "hot money" in the period between the two World
Wars were among the reasons why members would not give up any part of
their authority over capital transfers.
The drafters of the original Articles expected many members to central-
ize the foreign exchange earned by their residents. One purpose of the
surrender of foreign exchange was to prevent capital flight. 38 Surrender
requirements were not prohibited, because surrender was not in itself an
impediment to the making of payments. It did not follow that a member
would refuse to provide its residents with the foreign exchange they
needed to make payments for current international transactions, or that
the member would refuse to provide nonresidents with the means to trans-
fer into their own currency their earnings in current transactions with
residents.
The IMF's resources were available to assist a member that found it
difficult to provide the foreign exchange for either purpose. If there was a
deficit in the member's balance of payments, the member could turn to the
IMF for resources. If as a result of a deficit in the balance of payments of
36. Articles of Agreement, Art. I(iv); Id Art. VIII, § 2(a) (original Articles).
37. Id. Art. VI, § 3 (original Articles).
38. When it became clear that the U.S. did not share his (Keynes's) view on this
issue [the suggestion that central control of inward and outward capital
movements should be a permanent feature of the post-war world], he insisted
that strict capital controls be permitted in the new international monetary
order in those countries which chose to adopt them. Keynes argued here, as
he had in the 1930s, that the free flow of capital among countries would
make successful domestic planning for full employment in any country
impossible.
Crotty, On Keynes and Capital Right, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 59, 62 (1983). See generally
J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS UNDER THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 21, 1977) (discussing the control of interna-
tional capital movements).
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Terra, Patria, which imposed exchange surrender requirements on its resi-
dents, held the currency of Terra, Patria could require Terra to buy the
balances of Terra's currency held by Patria. This was a form of official
convertibility, because it operated only between monetary authorities. 39
The obligation was subject to a number of limitations, among which two
were most important. First, official convertibility was designed to be in
support of market convertibility. Patria could demand the conversion of
the balances it held only if they had been recently acquired as the result of
current international transactions, or, if the balances did not meet this cri-
terion, conversion was needed for making payments for current transac-
tions. Second, the obligation had to be performed only if Terra was in a
position to use the IMF's resources. This limitation did not mean that
Terra had to use the IMF's resources in making the conversion, but only
that it was able to use them if it wished.
Official convertibility through the mechanism of the IMF as explained
above never became a feature of the international monetary system. The
provision requiring official conversion was inspired in part by the prospect
that the volume of foreign exchange necessary for payments and transfers
for current international transactions might be too great for the exchange
markets. In time, however, exchange markets developed sufficient capac-
ity for this purpose. They were allowed to operate without the hindrance
of surrender requirements. If a deficit developed in a member's balance of
payments, the member could turn to the IMF not for the resources with
which to convert foreign official holdings, but to put resources into the
exchange market in support of the member's currency. Few currencies
were used in international payments, and only these currencies were accu-
mulated in the monetary reserves of members. In any event, therefore, few
members would have been called on for official convertibility even if the
obligation had been invoked. Moreover, the leading reserve currency by
far was the U.S. dollar, and members could request gold for their holdings
of dollars, if they wished, in accordance with the separate undertaking of
the United States.
The neglect of official convertibility is an illustration of the radical mis-
judgments about future developments that the drafters of treaties can
make. There was an elegance about the obligation of official convertibility
that helped to complete a system based on par values and the multilateral
system of payments and transfers for current international transactions.
The wonder is not that the future was unforeseeable, but that the Articles
could work effectively for so long, without legal strain, in conditions radi-
cally different from those that had been foreseen at Bretton Woods.
The theory that justified the contribution of resources to the IMF was
that they could be made available to a member in balance of payments
difficulty to enable it to support its currency either by performing the obli-
gation of official convertibility or by maintaining market convertibility.
39. Articles of Agreement, Art. VIII, § 4 (original Articles).
[Vol. 38
INTERNA TIONAL MONETIR Y SYSTEM
The resources helped a member to preserve the order that was the objec-
tive of the international monetary system under the original Articles. A
member would not be forced by circumstances to withdraw support from
the par value for its currency or to resort to restrictions, discriminatory
currency arrangements, multiple currency practices, or competitive
devaluation.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT
In 1969 the First Amendment of the IMF's Articles became effective,
two years before the collapse of the par value system. The First Amend-
ment was intended to reinforce the international monetary system as it
then existed. Members were to be provided with monetary reserves, in the
form of the SDR as a new reserve asset, if the IMF decided that there was
a long-term global need to supplement existing reserve assets. Allocations
were to be made, or SDRs cancelled, in such manner as would promote
attainment of the purposes of the IMF and would avoid economic stagna-
tion and deflation as well as excess demand and inflation in the world.40
The IMF would be able to manage the global volume of reserves in a
rational manner if, as was hoped, the United States would eliminate the
deficits in its balance of payments.
The original Articles gave the IMF regulatory functions to ensure stable
exchange rates, a multilateral system of payments and transfers for current
international transactions, and collaboration between members and the
IMF on monetary problems. The task of the IMF was to preserve order
not only by promoting these objectives, but also by acting as the organiza-
tion to which other members were to address complaints that a member
was failing to observe its obligations to maintain order. The Articles were
based on a principle of reciprocity, qualified by certain limited derogations
such as the transitional arrangements, but members were not permitted to
resort to self-help if a breach of obligation occurred. If they could suspend
their obligations by way of retaliation, disorder would be compounded.
The IMF had the duty to see that a breach was repaired and full order
restored.
The financial function of the IMF was to act, in effect, as a financial
intermediary by providing the currencies of members in balance of pay-
ments surplus to members in balance of payments deficit. The First
Amendment added a function that implied the management of official li-
quidity, including the form in which, to some extent, reserve assets should
be held.
SDRs were a supplement to existing reserve assets, which meant, as one
of the multiple connotations of this language, that neither currencies nor
gold would be ostracized from reserves simply because of the arrival of the
SDR.41 Some members were anxious to preserve the status of gold as a
40. Id Art. XXIV, § I(a) (First Amendment); Id. Art. XVIII, § 1(a).
41. J. GOLD, SPECIAL DRAWINO RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE (IMF Pamphlet
Series No. 15, 1971).
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reserve asset, while the United States wanted no suggestion of exile for the
dollar. The allocation of SDRs, however, would enable members to re-
ceive additions to their reserves in the form of an internationalized asset
instead of relying on a national asset, the U.S dollar, the volume and qual-
ity of which depended on the policies of a single country. Furthermore,
the vagaries of gold production and the destination of new gold need not
give concern that gold was an unreliable source of reserves, even though
gold remained in law the common denominator of the par value system
and the subject of the U.S. undertaking as the fundamental norm of the
system.
The benefits of the rational management of global reserves by means of
the SDR scheme would accrue to all members, and the benefits were re-
sponsible for the vigorous support that the United States gave to the pro-
ject that led to the First Amendement. The United States was interested in
a more particular benefit for itself: the SDR could assist the United States
to maintain the official convertibility of the dollar. As there was to be no
frontal attack on the position of gold in the international monetary system,
members were unwilling to forgo the privilege of obtaining gold from the
United States in officialsettlements in accordance with the undertaking it
had given under the original Articles. Faced with this resolve of other
members, the United States wanted some assurance that it would be able
to use its holdings of SDRs as well as its gold, when called upon to convert
official holdings of dollars. The best that the United States could negotiate
was a provision under which it could convert dollar balances with SDRs
by agreement with the member that was tendering the balances for
conversion.42
Whatever the future of the SDR may be, the agreement to create it was
an extraordinary development in international organization, the interna-
tional monetary system, and international law. As an imaginative and ad-
venturous attempt to respond to international monetary problems it is
second only to the agreement represented by the original Articles.
VI. COLLAPSE OF PAR VALUE SYSTEM
On August 15, 1971, the President announced that the monetary author-
ities of the United States would no longer convert foreign official holdings
of dollars with gold or other reserve assets, and that no steps would be
taken to see that exchange rates for the U.S. dollar were kept within de-
fined margins. The United States had concluded that it was locked into an
intolerable position in which it would not be able to achieve an effective
devaluation of the dollar, and, therefore, the United States saw no point in
proposing a change in par value. The United States had no hope of curing
the disequilibrium in its balance of payments and restoring its lost compet-
itiveness in international trade except by the drastic action it took. The
42. Articles of Agreement, Art. XXV, § 2(b)(i) (First Amendment); see id. Art. XIX,
§ 2(b).
[Vol. 38
INTERNA TIONAL MONETAR Y SYSTEM
country that was the chief architect of the international monetary system
was aware that it was bringing about the collapse of the system. Although
it did not justify its action by reference to anything like the plea of rebus sic
stantibus, the assumption of persistent surplus in the balance of payments
on the basis of which the United States had negotiated the Articles had
been proved to be unfounded in the face of persistent deficits.
The action by the United States was in breach of its obligations under
the Articles, but not by the withdrawal of the undertaking to engage in
official gold transactions for dollars. That undertaking was not mandatory
under the Articles. The breach was the failure to apply other appropriate
measures that would restrain exchange rates in transactions involving the
dollar and the currencies of other members within the margins around
parities consistent with the Articles. The United States was responsible for
taking other measures to ensure observance of the legal margins, because
the abandonment of its undertaking had produced the neglect of parities
for the dollar. A principle of the Articles, it has been seen, is that each
member is responsible for its own currency, and that this responsibility
cannot be thrust onto other members. The refusal of the United States to
perform the obligation of official convertibility in support of the multilat-
eral system of payments as discussed above was a further violation of the
Articles.
VII. SECOND AMENDMENT
From 1972 to 1974 strenuous efforts were made to reform the interna-
tional monetary system. No direction was given to the discussions until
the United States advanced a plan for a par value system that would have
operated more symmetrically to compel adjustment by members whether
in deficit or in surplus in their balances of payments.43 The United States
had come to the view that its persistent deficits were the result of an un-
symmetrical system that did not exert sufficient influence on members in
surplus to compel them to adjust their balances of payments. The deficit
of the United States about which many other members had complained
was the mirror image of the persistent surpluses in some of their balances
of payments. These members, however, blamed the predicament of the
United States on its "benign neglect" of the balance of payments, which
meant the preference of the United States to conduct its external and do-
mestic policies without concern for its balance of payments.
The United States proposed a system that would be more mechanical as
well as more symmetrical in compelling adjustment. Objective indicators
based on increases or decreases in monetary reserves would point to the
member or members that should take steps to adjust their balances of pay-
ments by appropriate measures, which might include changes in the par
values of their currencies. The indicators would be decisive or at least
43. Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress January 1973, at 120-
31, 160-74.
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would raise a strong presumption that the member to which they pointed
had the responsibility to take corrective action. Graduated pressures
would be applied according to stages in the accumulation or loss of
reserves. The amounts of reserves that would define these stages would be
agreed with, or established by, the IMF. The pressures would resemble,
but would not be considered, sanctions in the ordinary sense, because, by
analogy to a concept of the original Articles and the First Amendment,
disciplinary consequences could be attached to undesirable policies with-
out treating the policies as breaches of obligation. The consequences,
however, could be the same as those that were attached to actions classified
by the Articles as violations of the treaty.44
The U.S. plan was based on two suppositions of some interest in inter-
national law and organization. One supposition was that there would be a
widespread preference among other members for such a mechanical appa-
ratus. The other supposition was that public opinion would more readily
accept the mechanical operation of objective indicators than the exercise of
discretionary authority by an international organization. The first suppo-
sition was shown to be unfounded because the representatives of other
members made it clear that they preferred the exercise of discretion by an
international organization. Members would have the opportunity to influ-
ence the judgments of the organization without the burden of having to
rebut a presumption of responsibility for troublesome developments. For
this reason members were not enthusiastic about even a weak presumption
based on objective indicators. The correctness of the second supposition
could not be tested because a par value system could not be restored.
The outcome of the efforts to reform the international monetary system
was a tentative and incomplete Outline of Reform that was transmitted to
the Board of Governors of the IMF in June 1974 with the express realiza-
tion that, at best, the reform would take place in the future.45 A central
feature of the Outline was the restoration of a par value system, with the
elimination of deficiencies that had been demonstrated in the operation of
the original par value system. One improvement was recognition of the
legality of floating in some circumstances. In the conditions of June 1974,
there was no hope of instituting a par value system in any form, whatever
the alleviations of its rigor might have been. The Outline recommended a
start on evolutionary reform by the adoption of a limited number of imme-
diate steps during an interim period.
Such a project did not appeal to some members because it did not repre-
sent a thorough reform. The United States, however, pressed for the re-
turn to legality by means of an amendment of the Articles even if no more
would be achieved than the legalization of practices that were then illegal.
This attitude prevailed and led to the Second Amendment of the Articles,
the negotiation and drafting of which were completed in March 1976. The
Second Amendment became effective on April 1, 1978.
44. J. GOLD, supra note 1, at 148-216.
45.- DOCUMENTS OF COMMITTEE OF TWENTY, supra note 29, at 7-48.
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In the course of the period that succeeded the transmission of the Out-
line, the decision was reached that an amendment of the Articles should
not concentrate on an interim period or on immediate steps, but should
sweep across the full breadth of the Articles. The new provisions should
be appropriate to the immediate situation, but should grant powers that
would enable the international monetary system and the IMF to evolve
without the need for further amendment, at least to meet foreseeable
developments.
A major contest before the drafting of the Second Amendment was com-
pleted was the character of the exchange rate regime to be regulated by the
Articles. Some members, with France most insistent among them, wanted
some assurance of return to a degree of fixity in exchange rates. The
United States resisted this attitude. It would not support any expression of
the legal or moral superiority of fixed exchange rates at any time. The
rejection of an obligation to maintain a fixed external value for currencies
would enable members to concentrate on domestic policies. The fluctua-
tion of exchange rates to accord with underlying conditions would produce
exchange rates that were economically appropriate, and would encourage
members, whether in surplus or in deficit in their balances of payments, to
develop orderly underlying conditions and to eliminate too much fluctua-
tion. The effect would be a stable system of exchange rates that would be
more desirable than the imposition of fixed exchange rates, which, para-
doxically, had not produced stability.
The United States succeeded in its opposition to any recognition of the
desirability of fixed exchange rates. The main concession in the compro-
mise with those members that preferred fixity at some time, although not
an immediate return to it, was the inclusion in the Articles of a flexible par
value system that could be called into operation if certain conditions were
found to be satisfied. The decision to take this action could be made with
a majority of eighty-five percent of the total voting power of members,
which gave the United States a veto over a proposed decision.4 6
The outstanding characteristic of the provisions on exchange rates in the
Second Amendment is that there is no insistence on a unified regime.
Each member is free to choose its exchange arrangement, with the excep-
tion that a member may not maintain the external value of its currency in
terms of gold. A member is free also to determine the external value of its
currency under the chosen exchange arrangement. The Second Amend-
ment departs from the design of the original Articles, under which only
one exchange arrangement was permissible-a par value-and under
which the par value had to receive the endorsement of the IMF.
The doctrine that exchange rates are a fit subject for international con-
cern has not been abandoned, and, therefore, various safeguards have
been adopted, including those that are listed here:
(a) Each member must observe certain obligations in the conduct of its
46. Articles of Agreement, Art. IV, § 4; id. Sched. C.
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policies that bear directly or indirectly on exchange rates. These obliga-
tions are formulated for the most part in the language of soft law:
[Elach member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other
members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a
stable system of exchange rates. In particular, each member shall:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward
the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reason-
able price stability, with due regard to its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying eco-
nomic and financial conditions and a monetary system that does
not tend to produce erratic disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international mone-
tary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments
adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over
other members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings
under this Section. 47
(b) The IMF must oversee the compliance of each member with the
obligations quoted in (a) above.48
(c) The IMF must exercise "firm surveillance" over the exchange rate
policies of members.49
(d) The IMF must adopt "specific principles for the guidance" of all
members with respect to their exchange rate policies.50
(e) When requested, each member must consult with the IMF on the
member's exchange rate policies. 51
These safeguards do not dispel the impression that, on exchange rates,
the Second Amendment regresses a long way toward the sovereignty that
members exercised before the IMF came into existence. The contrast be-
tween the original Articles and the Second Amendment is less stark if the
operation of the par value system is taken into account. In the IMF's ad-
ministration of that system it was normal to give the benefit of the doubt to
any member that was proposing a change in the par value of its currency.
Nevertheless, the necessity for the IMF's concurrence did have a discipli-
nary effect that cannot be wholly discounted.
One of the most difficult issues in any regime for exchange rates under
international law, and an issue that cannot be avoided, will be the distribu-
tion of authority between the administering international organization and
the countries subject to that administration. These countries will start al-
ways from the position that the exchange rates for currencies have been
subject to national jurisdiction in the past. The quid pro quo for the sur-
render of sovereignty is modest. Under any legal regime, the voice that
each country can have in the determination of exchange rates for the cur-
47. Id. Art. IV, § 1.
48. Id. Art. IV, § 3(a).
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rencies of other members can be only a small one. The argument for sur-
render must be cast more in negative terms: avoidance of the disorder that
would develop if there were no international pooling of authority. The
guerdon is the second best, about which more is said below.
The freedom of members to choose their exchange arrangements and to
determine the external value of their currencies is one of the three leading
principles of the Second Amendment.52 The other two principles are that
the role of gold in the international monetary system is to be reduced and
that the SDR is to become the principal reserve asset in the system. Gold
functioned poorly as the primary reserve asset. The Second Amendment
has deprived it of this quality within the IMF,53 for example, by abrogat-
ing the official price, by prohibiting transfers of gold between the IMF and
members in settlement of obligations, and by proscribing the use of gold as
a denominator in terms of which the external value of currencies can be
maintained. The Articles also include safeguards against the restoration of
gold to anything like its former position in the IMF. Nothing in the Arti-
cles strips gold of its character as a reserve asset. Gold continues to be
held in large quantities in the reserves of members, although it does not
function well as a reserve asset. Monetary authorities are reluctant to
make irreversible transfers of their gold because fluctuations in its price
might make transferors seem improvident or shortsighted.
What is meant by the objective of making the SDR the principal reserve
asset in the international monetary system is not clear. The United States
preferred the word "principal" to other suggested adjectives, such as "cen-
tral," because "principal" implied more obviously that there would be
other reserve assets. The United States was protecting the future legal
position of the dollar. Below the surface of the language of the Second
Amendment are the conclusions of many members that gold performed
badly as the primary reserve asset and that an international monetary sys-
tem based on a currency will not be optimal because the system will be
dependent on the policies of the issuer of the currency.
Notwithstanding the imprecision of the objective that the SDR is to be-
come the principal reserve asset, the objective can have normative effects.
The Second Amendment has improved the characteristics of the SDR and
has extended its uses. The Articles include provisions under which the
IMF can do more along these lines. The IMF has already made some
exercise of these powers, but no claim can be made that the SDR is ap-
proaching its assigned role in the system.54 One impediment on its road is
52. The Second Amendment made many changes that cannot be subsumed under these
three principles, such as the "modernization" of the IMF's financial activities and organiza-
tional structure, much of which reflected the IMF's practice as it had developed over the
years.
53. Gold, Go/din International Monetary Law Change, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity, 15
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 323, 351-59 (1981).
54. Gold, A New Universal and a New Regional Monetary Asset: SDR and ECU, 34
OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 117
(1983).
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that too few SDRs have been allocated. Allocations have been obstructed
by the volume of currencies held in reserves. An implication of the posi-
tion that the SDR is supposed to reach is that currencies as well as gold
will have diminishing roles as reserve assets, but there is no a priori as-
sumption about the relative proportions that SDRs and other assets should
have in individual or global reserves. The volume of reserve currency has
increased because of the ease with which until lately currency could be
borrowed in financial markets to augment reserves. The IMF has no pow-
ers to prevent excessive borrowing or excessive lending.55
The increase in the number of currencies held in reserves is another
monetary development of recent years. The deutschemark, Japanese yen,
and Swiss franc have joined the company of the U.S. dollar, although the
dollar is still held in much the largest amount.56 The variability of ex-
change rates is one explanation of the growth in the number of reserve
currencies. Monetary authorities hold more than one reserve currency to
reduce risk. Fluctuations also induce monetary authorities to move from
one reserve currency to another in the management of their portfolio, with
the consequence that these movements through the medium of exchange
markets provoke further changes in exchange rates. Shifts from one re-
serve asset to another have been destabilizing even when there were fewer
reserve assets. The IMF does not have clear authority to control the choice
members make of currencies to hold in reserves or the decisions of mem-
bers to switch from one currency to another, notwithstanding the principle
of the Second Amendment that the SDR is to be elevated to the position of
the principal reserve asset.57
The changing fortunes of the U.S. dollar produce a pendulum effect in
thinking about the future of the international monetary system. Should
the system be based on a strong central currency, or would a multicurrency
reserve system be preferable? The dominance of the dollar was formerly
based on the power of the U.S. economy and the law governing the par
value system. The dominance of the dollar has not ceased with the abro-
gation of the par value system.
The disturbing effects of switches among reserve currencies through the
exchange markets led the IMF to consider the proposal of a Substitution
Account.58 Under this proposal, members would have been able to deposit
55. Either development, however, may occasion the need for special discussion with a
member under the IMF's procedures for surveillance over exchange rate policies. See SE-
LECTED DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 12.
56. R. ROOSA, RESERVE CURRENCIES IN TRANSITION (1982).
57. Articles of Agreement, Art. VIII, § 7 provides:
Each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and with other mem-
bers in order to ensure that the policies of the member with respect to reserve
assets shall be consistent with the objectives of promoting better international
surveillance of international liquidity and making the special drawing right
the principal reserve asset in the international monetary system.
The IMF has made no call for specific action under this provision.
58. See Gold, Substitution in the International Monetary System, 12 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 265 (1980). The multiplicity of reserve assets and the destabilizing effects of shifts
among them promoted plans for the combination of assets in a single composite reserve asset
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holdings of U.S. dollars in the Account and receive in return claims de-
nominated in the SDR with characteristics and uses that would have ena-
bled depositors to regard their claims as reserve assets. The deposits would
not have resulted in a reduction in the depositors' reserves. The Substitu-
tion Account would have offered not only an alternative reserve asset, but
also an opportunity for members to diversify their reserve assets, in effect,
because the SDR is valued according to a basket of five leading currencies.
Moreover, the diversification would have been arranged without going
through the exchange markets and would have helped to construct an in-
ternational monetary system based on the SDR instead of the dollar or
reserve currencies.
The Substitution Account could have been established under a provision
that was written into the Second Amendment as a technique for helping in
the evolution of the international monetary system without the necessity
for amendment:
If requested, the Fund may decide to perform financial and techni-
cal services, including the administration of resources contributed by
members, that are consistent with the purposes of the Fund. Opera-
tions involved in the performance of such financial services shall not
be on the account of the Fund. Services under this subsection shall
not impose any obligation on a member without its consent. 59
The Substitution Account would have been a structural development in
the international monetary system and perhaps the beginning of a change
in the international role of the U.S. dollar.
The active pursuit of the project was abandoned in 1980 for a number of
reasons, one of which was the unwillingness of the United States to assume
some of the financial obligations that would have been essential to make
claims on the Account desirable reserve assets. The United States re-
garded the Account as a development in the international monetary system
of benefit to all members of the IMF, so that it was not justifiable to expect
the United States to accept special burdens to ensure that interest could be
paid at all times and the impairment of capital avoided.
VIII. PRESENT CONDITIONS
Many critics assert that present international monetary arrangements
are unsatisfactory. To the protestation that the world has grown accus-
tomed to present arrangements and that their resiliency prevents collapse,
the critics reply that the system has collapsed.
Some of the major criticisms of present conditions are summarized be-
low. The leading criticisms relate to experience with exchange rates:
After nine years' experience with a floating exchange rate system, it is
hard to deny that the results have been disappointing. Although
even before the present increase in the number of reserve assets. See C.J. DEVINE INSTITUTE
OF FINANCE, Compendium of Plans for International Monetary Reform, in THE BULLETIN,
Nos. 37 & 38 (R. Hawkins ed. Dec. 1965).
59. Articles of Agreement, Art. V, § 2(b).
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world trade has not been perceptibly impeded by floating rates and
world capital markets have probably been better integrated in the
1970's than before, exchange rates-and also relative prices, i.e.,
"real" exchange rates-have been highly volatile. At the same time,
macroindependence has not followed from floating rates. Finally,
there is &rowing worry that the volatility of floating rates may threaten
the viability of the dollar's role as international money, with resulting
disruptive effects. 60
Members have chosen to apply numerous and diverse exchange ar-
rangements. A well-known counterproposal that was advanced when the
results of the Bretton Woods Conference were known was that only the
countries that conducted the major proportion of international trade and
finance should be required to establish par values, while the currencies of
other countries should be allowed to fluctuate in relation to the major cur-
rencies.61 Something like the reverse has happened. The major currencies
float against each other, but other currencies are pegged in a great variety
of ways. The profusion of exchange arrangements and differences in eco-
nomic performance inspire repeated exhortations in favor of the coordina-
tion of national macroeconomic policies among members, so that, in the
words of the Articles, "a stable system of exchange rates" can be
achieved. 62 At the same time, however, the profusion of exchange arrange-
ments and the failure to coordinate macroeconomic policies make it more
difficult for the IMF to annnounce specific principles for the guidance of
the exchange rate policies of members. The expectations of the U.S. nego-
tiators of the exchange rate provisions of the Second Amendment that ex-
perience would permit the formulation of a growing code of principles has
not been realized. Nothing has been added to the three original princi-
ples, 63 but the IMF repeatedly elaborates the procedures for consultation
and surveillance.
The volatility and the misalignment of exchange rates dispel any expec-
tation by the critics that present arrangements are likely to achieve the
purposes of the IMF and contribute to world order. The variability of
exchange rates has been much greater than under the par value system and
has exceeded the degree of variability that the proponents of freedom from
fixed rates had predicted.64
60. R. ECKAUS & D. LESSARD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY-A COLLOQUIUM
PHASE I RESEARCH FINDINGS 1-24 (1983). "The experience of the last ten years has made
most academic supporters of flexible exchange rates sadder but wiser . . . . The current
system of flexible exchange rates has not functioned in a manner that even approximates the
predictions of previously accepted theory." Dunn, The Many Disappointments of Flexible
Exchange Rates, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, No. 154, at 1 (1983); see also
Lever, Without reform we/ace all the dangers of disintegration and its attendant consequences,
The Guardian, May 24, 1982, at 9 ("The paradox has been that in seeking to gain greater
national autonomy the governments of the major economies have in fact reduced it. As in
many other fields, the acceptance of collective disciplines does not reduce but protects indi-
vidual freedom of action.")
61. J. WILLIAMS, POSTWAR MONETARY PLANS AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-21 (3d ed. 1945).
62. Articles of Agreement, Art. IV, § 1.
63. SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 11-12.
64. A massive number of studies of exchange rates under present conditions has ap-
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Floating has not eliminated exchange rate targets, which means that
many monetary authorities consider them desirable or essential. 65 The
volume of intervention in exchange markets has been substantial. Float-
ing rates have not eliminated, and perhaps have not even reduced, the de-
mand for reserves.
The justification of any form of regulatory jurisdiction must be to deter
or minimize disorder. The weaker the authority to require the adjustment
of balances of payments, the stronger is the need for resources to finance
widespread disequilibria in balances of payments if the collapse of the in-
ternational financial system, and with it the international monetary system,
is to be prevented. In conditions of this character, the financial function of
the IMF has become predominant. The volume of its transactions has es-
calated to absolute amounts and to proportions in relation to quotas that
would have seemed inconceivable in earlier years. Far more members
make concurrent use of the IMF's resources than ever in the past. In sum,
the IMF encourages members to achieve a sustainable balance of pay-
ments position more effectively through its financial activities than through
the exercise of its regulatory powers.
Certain consequences follow from this process. The ameliorative pro-
grams that the IMF supports must be adapted to the circumstances of each
member. It is not easy to formulate a code of principles of conditionality
for use of the IMF's resources without frustrating the need for individual
response to a member's problems. Even so, the IMF's conditionality is
frequently criticized as too standardized in its prescriptions. The IMF
would find it tactically unwise to emphasize too strongly that it is prag-
matic in taking account of the individual circumstances of members.
A regulatory code to which countries subscribe by membership in the
IMF gives less cause for discontent. Countries are aware of the obligations
of this code that they undertake by becoming members. 66 Conditionality,
however, gives scope for charges of oppressive behavior by the IMF in
making its resources available, because a code of conditionality is proba-
bly not feasible or desirable. Countries are not asked to subscribe to such
peared, and there is no sign of declining production. For two compilations, see EXCHANGE
RATE FLEXIBILITY (J. Dryer, G. Haberler & T. Willett eds. 1978) and THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM: A TIME OF TURBULENCE (J. Dryer, G. Haberler & T. Willett eds.
1982).
65. [T]he exchange rate is far too important a price-because of its effects on
domestic stability and activity, the balance of payments, and international
trade and payments relations-to be treated with "benign neglect" as a
"residual outcome" of domestic monetary and other economic policies. The
very fact that monetary and other economic policies are part of the forces
influencing the foreign exchange markets, makes it unavoidable that those
responsible for these policies "have a view " on the exchange rate and take the
possible impact of their policies on the exchange rate into account.
0. EMMINGER, EXCHANGE RATE POLICY RECONSIDERED 13 (Group of Thirty, Occasional
Papers No. 10, 1982) (emphasis in original). Emminger asserts, however, that the United
States is "a special case" and that free floating, with or without occasional intervention, is
the only advisable policy. Id. at 18-20.
66. See infra Appendix B.
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a code by becoming members. Any negotiation on the use of the IMF's
resources can take on the appearance of an encounter. Finally, regulation
through conditionality does not touch members that have no need to use
the IMF's resources. Those members tend to be the countries that have
leading roles in international trade and payments and that have most influ-
ence on the working of the international monetary system.
The critics of present monetary arrangements refer to them as a "non-
reform, ' 67 "non-system," 68 or "codified anarchy," 69 but other observers re-
gard this charge as too extreme. Present arrangements, they point out, are
based on a unifying principle that justifies the view that the arrangements
constitute a system. The principle is that the orderly underlying conditions
that are necessary for financial and economic stability will produce orderly
exchange arrangements and a stable system of exchange rates.70 The mar-
kets have developed techniques for protecting traders and investors from
the volatility of exchange rates. The allegation of the misalignment of ex-
change rates is based on current account considerations, but capital move-
ments have an immense impact on exchange rates that could not be
countered by intervention because of the cost that would be involved.
Neither fixed exchange rates nor free floating was acceptable to govern-
ments when the Second Amendment was negotiated. Either technique
would have required too great a surrender of authority over domestic pol-
icy and too great a transfer of sovereignty to an international organization.
The only practicable solution is the effort to achieve coordinated policies
among countries under the supervision of the IMF.71 The solution may be
second best, but it is the only feasible one in present circumstances.
IX. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IMF
There are at least three ways in which international law has an impact
on the international monetary system through the IMF as the central or-
ganization of the system. International law affects the day-to-day activities
of the IMF, evolution of the IMF under existing powers, and reform by
means of amendment of the Articles. 72 Each of these processes will be dis-
cussed in turn.
A. Day-to-Day Activities
The IMF has been meticulous in its observance of international law
67. de Vries, Jamaica, or the Non-Reform of the International Monetary System, 54 FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS 577 (1976).
68. Ryrie, A European View- Powerful Political Impulse Spurs Monetary Integration, J.
COM., Aug. 15, 1978, at 4A.
69. P. KENEN, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 202 (R. Mundell & J.
Polak eds. 1977).
70. Articles of Agreement, Art. IV, § 4(a).
71. See Haberler, The International Monetary System in World Recession, in ESSAYS IN
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: DISINFLATION 87-129 (W. Fellner Proj. Dir. 1984).
72. For the best survey of the system from the standpoint of the law, see K. DAM, supra
note 18.
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whenever the law comes into play.73 The reasons for what can properly be
considered a tradition of extraordinary sensitivity to the law among mem-
bers, organs, management, and staff are numerous. The IMF exercises
regulatory authority. Members are able to ensure a proper respect for the
boundaries of that authority through the vigilance of the Executive Board,
which is composed of Executive Directors appointed or elected by mem-
bers. The IMF administers substantial resources subscribed by members
or lent by them or by other official entities.74 Members in their capacity as
subscribers or lenders of resources are no less watchful than members in
their capacity as subjects of the IMF's regulatory authority. Members
would be deterred from further subscriptions or lending if the IMF were to
depart from legal rectitude.
The IMF is empowered to interpret its Articles authoritatively, that is to
say, with finality and binding effect for members and the IMF, if a ques-
tion of interpretation of provisions of the Articles arises between any mem-
ber and the IMF, or between members. This power is an exclusive one,
because, when questions within either of these two categories arise, mem-
bers are precluded from resort to some external tribunal.75 The power of
interpretation relates to "questions," it should be noted, and not to dis-
putes in any narrow sense. This unusual power might have led the IMF to
take a cavalier attitude toward legal considerations, but this has not been
the result, even though the power has been invoked only on rare occasions
and for exceptional reasons. The existence of the power in the background
enables the IMF to follow less formal procedures than those required for
authoritative interpretations. The IMF takes decisions on legal questions
by the same procedures it follows for other decisions. Although most in-
terpretations are made in this way, they are subjected to the same scrutiny
73. J. GOLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF Pam-
phlet Series No. 32, 1980).
74. The IMF can borrow from private entities with the concurrence of the member
whose currency the IMF borrows, Articles of Agreement, Art. VII, § 1, but the IMF has not
yet exercised this authority.
75. Id Art. XXIX; J. GOLD, INTERPRETATION BY THE FUND (IMF Pamphlet Series
No. 8, 1966). A joint committee of the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank
was appointed to consider certain matters arising from the application of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization to be accepted as an observer at meetings of the Boards of Governors.
The problems that arose related to interpretation and possible amendment of the By-Laws
of the Boards and not to interpretation of the Articles. Moreover, the findings of the Com-
mittee were advisory only. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS,
THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING 298-384 (1981).
Article VIII of the Agreement between the United Nations and the IMF, which came into
force on November 15, 1947, declares that
The General Assembly of the United Nations hereby authorizes the Fund
to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on any legal
questions arising within the scope of the Fund's activities other than questions
relating to the relationship between the Fund and the United Nations or any
specialized agency. Whenever the Fund shall request the Court for an advi-
sory opinion, the Fund will inform the Economic and Social Council of the
request.
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 406. The IMF has never requested an advisory
opinion.
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and legal discipline as would be applied if the procedures for authoritative
interpretation were being followed.
The normal legal work of the IMF has not been on the margin of the
IMF's activities. The approach has been creative in applying legal doc-
trines to problems of the IMF and the international monetary system 76 and
in contributing to the development of a coherent body of law within the
IMF. The decisions relating to the use of the IMF's resources by its mem-
bers are one example of bodies of complex rules that the IMF has devel-
oped over time for conducting its activities. The unique legal instrument
called the stand-by arrangement and its progeny, the extended arrange-
ment, have been invented by the IMF and have become the primary tech-
niques by which the IMF makes its resources available. 77 The two
instruments enable other official entities and private entities, such as
banks, to associate their loan agreements with the IMF's arrangements and
in this way contribute to greater order in international monetary and fi-
nancial affairs. 78
The adaptability of the IMF to new problems of the international mone-
tary system as they emerge is demonstrated by the financial policies that
have been instituted to deal with the difficulties of servicing sovereign
debt. The policy on Enlarged Access to the IMF's resources, changes in
the IMF's agreements to borrow, and the new relations with commercial
banks are among the examples of adaptation that have equipped the IMF
to exercise leadership and to collaborate with financial entities in avoiding
the serious disorder that might result from international indebtedness.
B. Evolution Under Existing Powers
International law in the everyday activities of the IMF can operate only
within the boundaries of the Articles and the rest of the corpusjuris of the
IMF as already developed under the Articles. The powers of the IMF to
modify the existing corpusjuris by new decisions, without amendment of
the Articles, give the IMF extensive authority to promote the evolution of
the international monetary system. The IMF has always had certain pow-
ers of variation, as they have been called, 79 but these powers have been
expanded by the Second Amendment.
The sweeping revision of the Articles by the Second Amendment was
nevertheless modest when compared with the ambitions that were enter-
tained when the Committee of Twenty was established. When work on the
Second Amendment was completed, it seemed that further change in the
76. See, e.g., Gold, Trust Funds in International Law: The Contribution of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund to a Code of Principles, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 556 (1978).
77. J. GOLD, THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE FUND'S STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS AND
WHY IT MATTERS (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 35, 1980).
78. J. GOLD, ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, THE PROMOTION OF IMF STAND-BY
ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE DRAFTING OF PRIVATE LOAN AGREEMENTS (IMF Pamphlet Se-
ries No. 39, 1982); Gold, Relations between banks' loan agreements and IMF stand-by ar-
rangements, INT'L FIN L. REV., Sept. 1983, at 28-35.
79. J. GOLD, supra note 1, at 336-52.
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international monetary system would occur, whether or not by later
amendments of the Articles. To provide room for evolution, and to avoid
the necessity for further amendment if it could be avoided, at least for
some time to come, the Articles contain a great many enabling powers, as
they came to be called.80 In a sense, the negotiating conference of the
representatives of member states, meeting in the Committee of Twenty,
but not as part of the normal structure of the IMF, has been dissolved in
favor of further negotiation, should there be the desire to initiate it, within
the permanent framework of the IMF.
Negotiation within the organs of the IMF and evolution under the
IMF's enabling powers do not preclude negotiations elsewhere. The
Group of Ten, consisting of ten of the leading industrial members of the
IMF, which may become the Group of Eleven if the nonmember Switzer-
land adheres to the IMF's General Arrangements to Borrow, remains in
existence and can place on its own agenda any monetary topic that seems
to be of sufficient interest. The members of the IMF whose representatives
compose the Group of Ten can cast in the IMF a large majority of the
weighted voting power of all members. If the group were to undertake
frequent examination of the current or potential activities of the IMF, the
group could be regarded as a steering committee, although not a commit-
tee appointed by any organ of the IMF.
The provisions of the Treaty of Rome8 on monetary matters were af-
fected by the assumption that the par value system of the original Articles
of the IMF would continue in existence. When the system began to show
signs of strain, members of the European Community began to pay more
attention to monetary relations among themselves and with countries
outside the Community, in particular the United States. The outstanding
legal development so far in the regulation of monetary relations within the
Community has been the creation of the European Monetary System
(EMS), which came into existence on March 13, 1979, under existing pow-
ers and without the need for amendment of the Treaty. The object of the
EMS is a zone of monetary stability in Europe that would insulate the
Community as far as possible from variability in the exchange rates of the
currencies of non-Community countries. The EMS was seen to be a step
toward European integration. At the heart of the EMS are exchange rate
and intervention arrangements that have some affinity with the former par
value system of the IMF, but also some basic differences from that system.
The European currency unit (ECU), which has some characteristics of a
monetary reserve asset, has been created to perform a variety of functions
within the EMS and also to serve other purposes within the European
Community.
The EMS was established for an initial period of two years with the
intention that a final ("institutional") phase would then be installed. A
80. For Keynes's views at one time on such powers, see infra Appendix B.
81. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome, March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 47 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
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more comprehensive monetary system would be constructed, with a Euro-
pean Fund at its center, and an ECU that was fully a monetary reserve
asset. The European Community has decided to prolong the initial phase
because the conditions have not been achieved in which the EMS can
move to its final phase. The experience of the EMS raises the question
whether a zone of true monetary stability can be established for currencies
of such importance in an unstable world.
How far the EMS and the ECU could be developed, when the time
comes, without amendment of the Treaty of Rome, is debated. According
to the Community's Commission, much is possible under article 235 of the
Treaty of Rome:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives
of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate
measures.
8 2
Some members of the Community take a more conservative view of
what can be done under article 235. They are more disposed to see pro-
posed changes as political actions that should be submitted to legislatures.
These members would rely on article 236 for substantial changes:
The Government of any Member State or the Commission may
submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of this Treaty.
If the Council, after consulting the Assembly and, where appropri-
ate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a confer-
ence of representatives of the Governments of the Member States, the
conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the
purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be
made to this Treaty.
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements. 83
The objectives of monetary stability and movement toward integration
were amplified by the conclusions of the Presidency of the European
Council on December 4-5, 1978:
It [the EMS] should be seen as a fundamental component of a more
comprehensive strategy aimed at lasting growth with stability, a pro-
gressive return to full employment, the harmonization of living stan-
dards and the lessening of regional disparities in the Community.
The European Monetary System will facilitate the convergence of
economic development and give fresh impetus to the process of Euro-
pean Union.84
In evaluating the experience of the EMS to mid-1983, the Select Com-
82. Id. art. 235.
83. Id art. 236.
84. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Conclusions of the Presidency of the
European Council of 4 and 5 December, in EUROPEAN ECONOMY 1 (March 1979).
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mittee on the European Communities of the House of Lords in the United
Kingdom wrote:
The first point to make. . . is that the EMS has survived. Its survival
as a system may have been purchased at the price of its partial failure
as a discipline; this is the kind of view expressed in descriptions of the
EMS as "a mere crawling peg." But countries have not "left" it as
they left the Snake.85
This assessment is reminiscent of the Abb6 Siey6s's "J'ai v6cu," but more
can be claimed for the experience of the EMS. It may provide some gui-
dance for the development of the international monetary system at large.
The work of the Group of Ten and the EMS are not the only examples
of change in the international monetary system that is considered or takes
place outside the IMF. The broadest powers to develop the system, how-
ever, are those of the IMF. What are some of these powers? Exchange
arrangements, once again, are crucial. The Articles provide that "each
member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to
assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of
exchange rates."'8 6 The IMF could give specific content to this obligation
by calling on members to follow certain policies. Obligations of collabora-
tion have been applied by the IMF in the past to clarify what it expects of
members under such obligations. 87 The IMF is directed by the Articles to
oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations on exchange
arrangements.8 8 The direction emphasizes a function that the IMF would
have even in the absence of the direction.
"To accord with the development of the international monetary sys-
tem," the IMF "may make provision for general exchange arrange-
ments." 89 The first clause, particularly in the use of the word "accord,"
implies that the IMF is not departing from the general opinion among
members on the way in which the international monetary system has de-
veloped when the IMF makes provision for general exchange arrange-
ments. The IMF cannot go beyond recommendations notwithstanding the
more peremptory appearance of the second of the two clauses quoted
above. The function of the IMF is to express to all members, including
those that may have doubts, the desirability of a particular kind of ex-
change arrangement. To make it clear that the IMF's endorsement is a
recommendation and not binding on members, the provision that confers
on the IMF the power to endorse general exchange arrangements declares
that the right of members to choose their exchange arrangements remains
unimpaired. It is likely, however, that most members would accept the
IMF's recommendation, if they were not already acting in conformity with
it, because the IMF is authorized to take a decision recommending a gen-
85. Session 1983-84, 5th Report, European Monetary System, July 26, 1983, para. 38, at
xiv (footnote omitted).
86. Articles of Agreement, Art IV, § 1.
87. J. GOLD, supra note 1, at 390-409.
88. Articles of Agreement, Art IV, § 3(a).
89. Id. Art. IV, § 2(c).
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eral exchange arrangement only if the decision is supported by eighty-five
percent of the total voting power.
A third power in connection with exchange rates is that the IMF can
adopt "specific principles for the guidance of all members" with respect to
their exchange policies.90
Lastly, the IMF is authorized to call into operation the provisions on the
par value system that are included in a schedule of the Articles. 9' This
system is more flexible than the original par value system and is free from
some of the earlier drawbacks. The Articles spell out the circumstances in
which the IMF could decide to vivify the par value system:
The Fund may determine, by an eighty-five percent majority of the
total voting power, that international economic conditions permit the
introduction of a widespread system of exchange arrangements based
on stable but adjustable par values. The Fund shall make the deter-
mination on the basis of the underlying stability of the world econ-
omy, and for this purpose shall take into account price movements
and rates of expansion in the economies of members. The determina-
tion shall be made in light of the evolution of the international mone-
tary system, with particular reference to sources of liquidity, and, in
order to ensure the effective operation of a system of par values, to
arrangements under which both members in surplus and members in
deficit in their balances of payments take prompt, effective, and sym-
metrical action to achieve adjustment, as well as to arrangements for
intervention and the treatment of imbalances. Upon making such de-
termination, the Fund shall notify members that the provisions of
Schedule C apply.92
Some features of this provision deserve comment. First, the circum-
stances in which the IMF could act under the provision can be considered
an ideal to which members have subscribed, notwithstanding the resist-
ance of the United States to the expression of any bias in favor of a par
value system. The provision was undoubtedly part of the compromise
with France in contemplating the possibility of an eventual return to fixed
rates. Another explanation may be that the United States expected that this
particular ideal would not be attained, as is often the fate of ideal solu-
tions. Second, some of the conditions that must be satisfied, such as those
relating to intervention and the treatment of imbalances, imply agreements
among members. The terms of these agreements are not prescribed by the
Second Amendment, 93 although the IMF could take initiatives to en-
courage members to reach the necessary agreements and could assist in
negotiating the terms.
Lastly, it will have been noted that two provisions that enable the IMF
90. Id. Art. IV, § 3(b).
91. Id. Art. IV, § 4; id. Sched. C.
92. Id. Art. IV, § 4.
93. On the curious legal compromise by which Article VIII, § 4 on official convertibility
was retained but deprived of practical application, see J. GOLD, USE, CONVERSION, AND
EXCHANGE OF CURRENCY UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT OF THE FUND'S ARTICLES 26-
32 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 23, 1978).
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to support certain kinds of exchange arrangement, although not to force
them on members, permit the IMF to act only with a majority of eighty-
five percent of the total voting power of members. The decisions for which
this majority is necessary are the recommendation of general exchange ar-
rangements and the activation of the par value system. Although there is
no obligation to apply a general exchange arrangement that the IMF has
recommended or to establish a par value if the par value system has been
called into effect, a member may be too embarrassed to exercise its inde-
pendence. The other two powers of the IMF that have been mentioned-
the powers to give content to the duty of collaboration and to adopt spe-
cific principles of guidance on exchange rate policies-can be exercised by
decisions taken with a majority of the votes cast.
The reduction in the role of gold in the international monetary system is
a principle of the Second Amendment because of opposition to gold as the
primary reserve asset. The price of gold as a commodity had disturbed the
functioning of gold as a reserve asset and as the common denominator of
the par value system. A prominent U.S. expert once described the London
gold market as "a time bomb resting at the very foundation of the Bretton
Woods system. '" 94 Moreover, gold could not be relied on to supplement
monetary reserves. The volume of production and the disposition of
newly produced gold were governed by considerations of profit and not by
the needs of the international monetary system.
The Second Amendment has deprived gold of its former official price
and prevented the emergence of a new official price,95 forbidden the main-
tenance of the external value of currencies in terms of gold,96 proscribed
the use of gold as the common denominator if a par value system were
restored, 97 abrogated the definition of the SDR by reference to gold,98 for-
bidden the discharge of obligations between the IMF and members with
gold,99 and required the IMF to dispose of one-third of its gold hold-
ings.l°° The Second Amendment has been effective in bringing about a
radical, and not a gradual, reduction in the role of gold in the IMF itself.
94. C. COOMBS, THE ARENA OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 68 (1976) (recounting the
vicissitudes to which the international monetary system was subjected by gold); see Gold,
supra note 53.
95. Articles of Agreement, Art. V, § 12; id. Art. VIII, § 7.
96. Id Art. IV, § 2(b).
97. Id. Sched. C, para. 1.
98. Id. Art. XV, § 2.
99. See id. Art. III, § 3; id. Sched. B, para. 2.
100. Id. Sched. B, para. 7; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1976 ANNUAL REPORT
121 (1977).
The amendments to the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of the United States in Novem-
ber 1983 instruct the Secretary of the Treasury to provide Congress with a review and analy-
sis of the feasibility of returning all or part of the IMF's remaining holdings of gold or of
selling gold in the market to raise resources. A similar instruction is given with respect to
the feasibility of a gold lending facility under which the IMF would lend gold to members
for use as collateral to secure commercial loans. The Secretary must review and analyze the
effect of the actions to be studied on the market price of gold and on countries whose central
banks maintain reserves in the form of gold. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 813, 97 Stat. 1153, 1276 (1983).
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This result does not eliminate gold from monetary reserves or stifle the
acceptability of gold to monetary authorities. Freeing the price of gold
from all restraint and the consequential fluctuations in price, however,
have deterred monetary authorities from disposing of their gold, so that it
is now inactive to a large extent as a monetary reserve asset. If use in
support of a currency is part of the definition of a monetary reserve asset,
gold scarcely meets the test.
Some well-known economists and some other public figures urge the
restoration of gold to a more prominent, and even a central, role in the
international monetary system. This support for gold, which sometimes
becomes a campaign, is an expression of dissatisfaction with the present
state of the system. The Congress of the United States appointed a Gold
Commission to study and make recommendations on the policy that the
U.S. Government should follow on the domestic and the international role
of gold. The Commission reported in March 1982 and recommended
against the restoration of a par value system based on gold as the common
denominator, but it also recommended that the IMF should not make fur-
ther dispositions of its gold in case such a system were restored.101
The Second Amendment has improved the characteristics and extended
the uses that can be made of the SDR. The IMF is authorized to carry the
process further so that the SDR can become the principal reserve asset in
the international monetary system. The IMF has taken a number of deci-
sions under this authority, but so far no action has been taken that can be
considered a structural development in the functioning of the SDR in the
international monetary system. A suggestion that might have had that ef-
fect was made by a former Managing Director of the IMF, who proposed
that members should hold SDRs in proportions to other reserve assets that
would be fixed from time to time, so that the IMF could control the total
volume of official liquidity, but nothing has come of this proposal so far. 0 2
Nor has anything happened so far to give effect to proposals that SDRs as
reserve assets and SDR-denominated claims and liabilities that are not
SDRs proper should be linked in some way, so as to mitigate the drawback
that the SDR proper is exclusively a reserve asset and cannot be held by
private entities. 0 3 The proponents of the ideas for linking the SDR and its
simulacrum allege that broader uses would be made of both and that
spread of the market-SDR would help the SDR proper to become the prin-
cipal reserve asset in the international monetary system. 14 Within the Eu-
ropean Community there is much support for enhancing the status of the
101. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ROLE OF GOLD IN THE
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEMS (1982). See also J. GOLD, SDRs,
CURRENCIES, AND GOLD: SIXTH SURVEY OF NEW LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 75-83 (IMF
Pamphlet Series No. 41, 1983) (legal analysis of Commission's recommendations).
102. Witteveen, 44 IMF SURVEY 313, 315 (1975). For a criticism of the idea, see J. MUR-
PHY, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: BEYOND THE FIRST STAGE OF REFORM
190-94 (1979).
103. Articles of Agreement, Art. XVII, § 3(i).
104. See INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND CREDIT: THE POLICY ROLES (G. von Fur-
stenberg ed. 1953); Coats, The SDA as a Means of Payment, 29 IMF STAFF PAPERS 422
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ECU proper by promoting the use of the market-ECU. Members of the
European Community have done much to encourage the spread of the
market-ECU because the ECU symbolizes the hope of closer integration
within the Community.
C. Amendment
If there were to be agreement on reform of the international monetary
system, that is to say, change that could not be put into effect by decisions
taken in the course of what have been called above the everyday activities
of the IMF, or by the exercise of its so-called enabling powers, or by agree-
ments made outside the IMF, there would remain amendment of the Arti-
cles. So far there have been two Amendments: the First was primarily for
the purpose of creating the SDR, and the Second was designed to take
account of the collapse of the par value system and to "modernize" the
IMF. Modernization meant, to a large extent, incorporation within the
Articles of many of the policies and practices that had been developed in
the day-to-day activities of the IMF. The effect of this process might be to
reduce the flexibility that had made it possible for the IMF to develop the
policies and practices.
Proposed amendments take effect if accepted by three-fifths of the mem-
bership and by members having eighty-five percent of the total voting
power.105 The practical consequences of this requirement are discussed
below.
X. A NEW BRETTON WOODS?
On a few occasions in the recent past, a prominent spokesman for an
industrial country, disgruntled by international monetary vicissitudes, has
suggested that a new Bretton Woods Conference might be convened to
consider reform of the international monetary system. Developing coun-
tries have made this appeal more frequently. The Intergovernmental
Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (the Group of
Twenty-Four), composed of the representatives of developing countries,
issued a communiqu6 in April 1983 in which the following passage
appeared:
Ministers. . . underscored the fact that the current monetary and fi-
nancial system suffers from many shortcomings and inequities, nota-
bly, the inadequate share of developing countries in decision making,
wide and erratic fluctuations in exchange rates, lack of symmetry in
surveillance, excessive dependence on a few key reserve currencies,
failure to increase international liquidity in line with the growth of
world trade, and increasing inadequacies in the resources of the inter-
national financial institutions. In the light of these considerations,
(1982); Gold, supra note 54; see also van den Boogaerde, The SDR as a Means of Payment:
A Comment on Coats, 30 IMF STAFF PAPERS 650 (1983).
105. Articles of Agreement, Art. XXVIII. For the amendment of three "safeguarded"
provisions, acceptance by all members is required.
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they were of the view that an international conference on money and
finance should be convened to find appropriate solutions to these
problems. 1 6
The few spokesmen for industrial countries have explained, after their
initial statements, that they really had intended a conference once suffi-
cient progress had been made toward common understandings. This pro-
cedure was followed for the original Articles. The Bretton Woods
Conference was preceded by more than two years of discussion among
officials and other experts. A diplomatic conference was not summoned
for the purpose of reaching agreement on the First and Second Amend-
ments. The First Amendment was preceded by a long period of study and
negotiation in the Group of Ten, the Second Amendment was preceded by
discussions in the ad hoc Committee of Twenty and by its successor, the
Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Mone-
tary System. Most of the topics mentioned in the communiqud of the
Group of Twenty-Four could be the subject of decisions by organs of the
IMF without the need for amendment of the Articles.
The topics mentioned in the communiqu6 as an agenda for reform of the
international monetary system are clearly within the scope of the system.
Some calls for a new Bretton Woods Conference propose to include within
the agenda subjects that do not fall within the boundaries of the interna-
tional monetary system, even though little has been done to define that
concept with precision. Proposals of an expansive agenda follow the pre-
cedent of the terms of reference of the Committee of Twenty. The resolu-
tion of the Board of Governors establishing the Committee directed it to
advise and report on all aspects of reform of the international monetary
system, including proposals for amendments of the Articles. The resolu-
tion then continued:
In considering and reporting on the matters covered by (a) above, the
Committee shall give full attention to the interrelation between these
matters and existing or prospective arrangements among countries, in-
cluding those that involve international trade, the flow of capital, in-
vestment, or development assistance, that could affect attainment of
the purposes of the Fund under the present or amended Articles. 10 7
As is evident from the Outline of Reform, the Committee of Twenty con-
centrated most of its attention on the international monetary system and
not on related matters.
The interrelationship among the elements in the terms of reference of
the Committee of Twenty are undeniable. The terms of reference implied
a negotiation more in the nature of an economic than a monetary confer-
ence. The difficulties of an economic conference might be even more
profound than those that arose in the negotiation of the law of the sea and
that still obstruct consensus after the drafting of the treaty.
106. Group of 24 Communiqu6, 12 IMF SURVEY 134, 134 (1983). The proposal was
repeated in a communiqu6 issued in September 1983, but with fewer details of agenda.
Group of 24 Communique, 12 IMF SURVEY 299, 299 (1983).
107. DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY, supra note 29, at 230.
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XI. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A weakness of the present time is that there are no political economists
with the prestige and influence of Keynes and White who could promote
the common understandings that would be the necessary precondition of
an international monetary conference. The task is far more difficult now
because of the distribution of power throughout the world. It becomes
fanciful to think back to the time when the task of creating an interna-
tional monetary system could have been initiated and carried forward al-
most to completion by the representatives of only two countries. If there
are no leaders of the caliber of Keynes and White, there are nevertheless
abundant proposals for change. Most of the proposals could be made ef-
fective under the existing powers of the IMF or by means of agreements
among groups of countries, which could be administered by the IMF. An-
other characteristic of the proposals is that, for the most part, they have
been made by persons who are not responsible for national policy.
Little, if any, support is expressed for a worldwide return to fixed rates
of exchange on the model of the former par value system or the par value
system in the present Articles or some adaptation of either system. There
is support, however, and probably growing support, for target rates or
zones and intervention policies to ensure that exchange rates move toward
and not away from the targets or zones, and for administration of such a
mechanism by the IMF.108 Some of these proposals are more concerned
with the misalignment than with the volatility of exchange rates. The vari-
ations on the theme of target rates or zones are manifold. 10 9
The behavior of exchange rates has inspired repeated speeches and other
declarations in favor of official intervention in the exchange markets. The
main purpose of the campaign has been to get the United States to join in
a concerted policy of intervention. The United States has subscribed on
many occasions to a policy of intervention to prevent disorderly exchange
markets, but the tendency has been to give a narrow interpretation to dis-
order and, therefore, to follow a practice of minimal intervention. The
hubbub in favor of a more active policy of intervention has subsided to a
considerable extent as a result of the largely negative conclusions of the
Jurgensen Report of March 1983.' t°
Intervention need not imply an agreement to stabilize exchange rates
among currencies at particular relationships, but an agreement for stable
108. HOUSE OF COMMONS SECOND REPORT FROM THE TREASURY AND CIVIL SERVICE
COMMITTEE, Session 1982-83, International Monetary Arrangements, at xli [hereinafter cited
as HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE SECOND REPORT].
109. J. WILLIAMSON, THE EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM 76 (1983). The connoisseur of
learned language will cherish "central rates in a set of mutually consistent and publicly
declared crawling target zones with soft margins." Id; see H. WITTEVEEN, DEVELOPING A
NEW INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: A LONG-TERM VIEW 19 (1983); TOWARDS A
NEW BRETTON WOODS: CHALLENGE FOR THE WORLD FINANCIAL AND TRADING SYSTEM
120 (1983) [hereinafter cited as TOWARDS A NEW BRETTON WOODS].
110. REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON EXCHANGE MARKET INTERVENTION ESTAB-
LISHED AT THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, JUNE 4, 5
& 6, 1983 (Philippe Jurgensen chair. 1983).
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relationships would require intervention, as is demonstrated by the EMS.
Proposals have been made that such an agreement should be entered into
by the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan, or by
the five members that issue the currencies in the basket that determines the
value of the SDR. The parties to the latter agreement would include the
United Kingdom and France as well as the other three countries." i'
A return to fixed rates, whether among three or five leading currencies
or among a wider number, and whether under the par value system that is
included in the Articles or under some different arrangement, is improba-
ble in the foreseeable future. For a return to fixed rates, it would be neces-
sary to assume that a common rate of inflation would prevail and that
currencies would be less vulnerable to capital flows than in the past. Mem-
bers participating in an agreement would have to be willing to subordinate
monetary policy to maintenance of the fixed rates. A collective agreement
on flexibility in changing fixed exchange rates, which seems to be the way
in which the EMS has developed, would raise the objection that fixed rates
are not fixed if they are subject to frequent change. Furthermore, it might
be necessary to find a country that would be willing to be at the center of
the system in the role that the United States performed under the par value
system. The United States has objected that this role was highly disadvan-
tageous to it and is not likely to undertake it again with a light heart. The
United States might demand safeguards, which would mean that its role
would be different from the one it performed in the past. The possibility
that the issuer of another currency might take on the role of the issuer of
the central (or pivot) currency, or be accepted in that role, is even more
remote.
The argument has been advanced by one author that the world economy
is inherently unsymmetrical in its functioning and that the legal endorse-
ment of asymmetry is impracticable. He cites the criticism by other coun-
tries that the central role of the U.S. dollar was favorable to the United
States as an example of the dislike for asymmetry. The conclusion he
draws from this argument is that reform by treaty should be avoided and
that the evolution of practices would be preferable. 1 2 U.S. officials, in
defending the present Article IV, explained that general principles would
emerge under the procedures of the Second Amendment. Increasingly de-
tailed decisions on procedures for surveillance have been developed, but
not a body of principles.
After the Committee of Twenty was dissolved, the Board of Governors
resolved, on the basis of the Committee's Outline of Reform, that: "the
Fund shall seek to gain further experience in the use of the objective in-
dicators, including reserve indicators, on an experimental basis, as an aid
in assessing the need for adjustment, but shall not use such indicators to
111. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE SECOND REPORT, supra note 108, at xli; To-
WARDS A NEW BRETTON WOODS, supra note 109, at 120.
112. Cooper, Prolegomena to the choice of an international monetary system, 29 INT'L
ORG. 95-96 (1975).
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establish any presumptive or automatic application of pressures." 11 3 This
direction dealt with the need for adjustment, which does not necessarily,
but may, require a change in the external value of a currency. The Fund
has not taken any decision on objective indicators. The EMS, however,
includes a "divergence indicator" based on the deviation of the exchange
rates for a currency from its central rate in terms of the ECU.
The multiplicity of reserve assets, among which reserve currencies repre-
sent the largest active component, and the destabilizing effects of move-
ments from one currency to another in the management of reserve
portfolios keep the idea of a Substitution Account alive, although only
barely.114 For the same reasons, numerous proposals are made to
strengthen the SDR so that it could become the principal reserve asset in
the international monetary system. 15 An attraction of the SDR is that it is
not a national asset, although increasingly its characteristics resemble
those of currencies in contrast to gold as the original model. The value of
the SDR is affected by national policies, because the method of valuing the
SDR is based on a basket of currencies, but the composition of the basket
is determined by international considerations. l1 6
The IMF has no regulatory authority over movements of capital. To
control or not control them is a decision for the monetary authorities of
each member. Freedom for capital movements has had both beneficial
and detrimental consequences. Harmful consequences have followed from
the practice of many countries in regulating the transactions of banks with
nonresidents more lightly than transactions with residents, and from the
practice of reduced taxation on foreign-owned banks. Branches, subsidiar-
ies, and affiliates of foreign banks tend to become established in countries
in which these practices are followed.
113. SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 354.
114. H. WITrEVEEN, supra note 109, at 15-16; TOWARDS A NEW BRETTON WOODS, supra
note 109, at 132; GROUP OF THIRTY, RESERVE ASSETS AND A SUBSTITUTION ACCOUNT:
TOWARDS A LESS UNSTABLE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1980). The report of the
Group of Thirty stated in part:
It is clear, in the opinion of the Study Group, that there is a serious reserve
asset problem in today's international monetary arrangements. In particular,
it is unlikely that the dollar can continue indefinitely to provide some 80 per-
cent of the world's foreign exchange reserves. It may be felt that it is inappro-
priate for any national currency to play this central role and that efforts should
be made over the longer term to establish the primacy of an international
reserve asset; or it may be felt that there is a disequilibrium in the existing
pattern of reserve holdings which can only be satisfied over time with the
growth of other national currencies as reserve assets; or, even if neither of
these long-run aims is subscribed to, it may be felt that the present situation
leads to avoidable instability in foreign exchange markets.
Id. at 3.
115. These proposals include a change in the structure of the IMF that, in effect, would
merge the General Department and the Special Drawing Rights Department, eliminate the
holding of currencies, and construct the IMF on the basis of the SDR only. Amendment of
the Articles would be necessary. J. POLAK, THOUGHTS ON AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND BASED FULLY ON THE SDR (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 28, 1979).
116. J. GOLD, SDRs, CURRENCIES, AND GOLD: FIFTH SURVEY OF NEW LEGAL DEVEL-
OPMENTS 1-13 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 36, 1981).
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The United States, concerned about the detrimental consequences of
such practices, has proposed an agreement with other countries under
which Eurobanks would be subject to controls and regulations on their
activities. The parties to an agreement would impose the same reserve re-
quirements on off-shore as on domestic banking operations. l17 The U.S.
initiative has not led to agreement."18 In the absence of agreement, the
United States is now attracting Eurocurrency business by authorizing in-
ternational banking facilities on U.S. territory. Under these facilities, cer-
tain transactions with nonresidents are exempted from the reserve
requirements and regulations on interest rates to which the transactions
formerly were subject.'19
Recommendations by international bodies are made on aspects of the
supervision of banking by the European Community's Groupe de Contact
of supervisory authorities and by the Committee on Banking Regulations
and Supervisory Practices, meeting under the auspices of the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements and composed of representatives of the central
banks of the Group of Ten and Switzerland.
120
The problems that arise as a result of the activities of banks that operate
internationally have focused increasing attention on the need for under-
standings on responsibility for the liquidity and solvency of these banks
that go beyond the limited recommendations of the two bodies mentioned
above:
[M]ost large banks have substantial relationships with scores of coun-
tries. Obviously, the ideal LLR [lender of last resort] for an interna-
tional bank would be an institution that represents the world
community. It is equally obvious that such an institution will be a
long time coming. Cooperation and consultation among national
LLRs may compensate to some extent for the lack of an appropriate
international institution, but such arrangements are cumbersome to
negotiate and may be unreliable in a crisis 21
The indebtedness already contracted by sovereign borrowers, with na-
tional banks and in the Euromarkets, has created a threat to the financial
and monetary systems because of the difficulty of servicing and repaying
the debt. To deal with accumulated debt, and the threat it poses, a flood of
ideas has gushed forth, and the flow has not ceased. A number of the
proposals would require new legal measures, particularly when the pro-
posals involve the assumption of some form of official responsibility for
117. For a discussion of some of the difficulties, see HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE
SECOND REPORT, supra note 108, at lxxi.
118. A. SWOBODA, CREDIT CREATION IN THE EUROMARKET: ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTROL 30-33 (Group of Thirty, Occasional Papers No. 2, 1980).
The difficulties of negotiating international agreements are illustrated by the absence of uni-
form regulations in the European Community. See Tugendhat, Foreword, THE REGULATION
OF BANKS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EEC (J. Welch 2d ed. 1981).
119. International Banking Facilities.- U.S. Federal Reserve Bidsfor London's Euromarket
Business, 13 INT'L CURRENCY REV. 11 (1981).
120. R. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION AROUND THE WORLD 5-7 (1982).
121. Guttentag & Herring, The Lender-of-Last-Resort Function in an International Con-
text, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 12 (No. 151, 1983).
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the indebtedness. None of these proposals has made progress so far in the
corridors of government. The necessity for new legal authority is a barrier,
even rf there were no other objections, because of resistance to "bailing
out" commercial banks. The difficulties of the debtors are taken to be evi-
dence of the imprudence of the banks. It is argued that the banks should
not be allowed to transfer their risks to the public and should not be en-
couraged to repeat their imprudence.
The Report of the U.S. Gold Commission has not silenced those critics
of present national and international economic policy who advocate the
solution of return to a monetary system based in some way on gold. ' 22 It is
difficult to conceive of such a reform of international monetary relations
that would not involve amendment of the Articles.
Many more proposals for change have been advanced, mostly by econo-
mists in their academic publications, in official hearings, and in the press.
The proposals referred to briefly above fall into a few broad categories and
seek:
(1) a degree of stability in exchange rates;
(2) control of the volume and composition of official liquidity;
(3) improvement in the status of the SDR; and
(4) control of transborder credit.
To these categories can be added another:
(5) strengthening the IMF.
The categories are not wholly discrete, which is another way of saying that
they are related to each other in an international monetary system.
XII. DIFFICULTIES OF CHANGE
An economist has written:
America emerged from both world wars as the dominant power mili-
tarily, industrially, and financially, and the dollar became the global
currency. It is a fact of historical tradition that the top currency is
provided by the top power. Money is a political phenomenon that
reflects-and partly conditions-the political configuration of the
world. My second observation is thus: The top political power has
usually had a commanding role in determining or vetoing the nature
of the international monetary system.' 23
It should have become apparent from this article that the legal history of
the international monetary system since the negotiation of the original Ar-
ticles supports the view that the system has been fashioned, developed, and
changed primarily under the influence of the United States. The United
States was the advocate of, and the chief influence on, the original Articles;
actively supported the GAB, which was thought to be primarily for the
benefit of the United States; pressed for the creation of the SDR; was the
immediate actor in bringing about the collapse of the par value system;
122. See 3 THE CATO J. 189 et seq. (1983).
123. Mundell, International Monetary Options, 3 THE CATO J. 189-90 (1983).
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insisted on the legalization of freedom to choose exchange arrangements
and on the decline in the position of gold in the international monetary
system; and refused to accept obligations that might have made it possible
to establish a Substitution Account. The prospect of worldwide change in
the system or in the international law governing it is negligible or nonexis-
tent unless the United States sponsors or supports a change. This truism
applies to all three manifestations of international law that have been men-
tioned above-in the everyday activities of the IMF, evolution under pres-
ent powers, and amendment of the Articles.
It is incontestable that the United States should act only when it sees
that its own interests will be promoted, but its own interests can corre-
spond with those of the world at large. Enlightened self-interest is not the
same as the automatic equivalence that was once claimed between the in-
terests of General Motors and those of the country.
The United States is not likely to rush to judgment about its self-interest.
A former Secretary of the U.S. Treasury has explained that the United
States can afford to wait:
Generally we tend to do the right things only in extremis . . . only
when the sight of the gallows becomes so clear that it finally clarifies
our minds. Since we are a rich country, we can muddle along, and
muddle along we do most of the time. I suppose one of the comfort-
ing thoughts, in conclusion, is that as you look at other countries, you
don't really see too many models that are any better. Where they are
better, it's sometimes because the country is smaller, and the problems
are not quite as complex as they are in our case.' 24
When the United States makes a proposal for change, it does not follow
that other members will conclude that it serves their interests as well. The
experience with the proposed Substitution Account is an example of the
disagreement that can arise about whose interest would be promoted.
Principles of uniformity and symmetry come to the surface whenever ef-
forts are made to develop the international monetary system. Members
prefer uniformity-sameness-in benefits and burdens. If it is unrealistic
to insist on uniformity because it is inconsistent with a world in which
there are different classes, the principle to which members adhere is sym-
metry-comparability in benefits and burdens. The proposal of a Substi-
tution Account was favored by the Carter Administration and actively
supported by the Under Secretary of the U.S. Treasury for Monetary Af-
fairs. The reaction of at least some members to the proposal has been
described by Henry C. Wallich, a distinguished member of the Governors
of the Federal Reserve System of the United States:
Whether the project will be reactivated is uncertain at this time. But
if progress is to be made, it would have to rest on a more complete
agreement concerning the purposes of a substitution account. There
has always been some ambivalence between two views of the account:
124. Blumenthal, Obstacles to Economic Decision-Making, J. COM., Oct. 20, 1981, at A4,
col. 6.
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as a long-term structural improvement in the world monetary system,
and as a conceivable means for bailing out the dollar from possible
short-run difficulties. In the American way of thinking, the support of
the proposal has always rested on its long-term r6le. It is not well
designed to serve the purpose of dollar support in the short run, even
if that purpose were regarded as desirable. 25
An irony of the failure of the project was that it might have helped to
diminish the function of the U.S. dollar as the main reserve currency. As
the international monetary system developed symptoms of instability,
members asserted increasingly that the United States had a favored posi-
tion and that the United States was able to pursue its policies and neglect
the interests of the system as a whole. The United States, however, em-
phasized the disadvantages that were forced upon it because of the central
role of the dollar. That view seems to have been concurred in at one time
by other countries that resisted the status of reserve currencies for their
currencies. The resistance by these countries has diminished, and has even
been replaced by encouragement, perhaps because of the benefits resulting
from the accumulation of the currencies by oil-exporting countries.
Sometimes, a proposal arouses political as well as economic ambitions,
with the result that negotiations can become prolonged and complicated.
When the United States has sought a structural development in the system,
European members, usually led by France, have seen an opportunity to
moderate the influence of the United States. The GAB was negotiated on
the assumption that the United States would be the main and perhaps the
only beneficiary. This assumption explains why the participants in the
GAB are bound only to consider whether they are willing to lend when
loans are requested. The participants are not obliged to lend when the
Managing Director proposes to make a call on them. 26 The participants
feared that if they undertook to lend, the United States might be able to
arrange for the use of the IMF's resources without meeting the IMF's stan-
dards of conditionality.
For the same reason, the participants established a procedure among
themselves for deciding whether to agree when the Managing Director
proposes that they lend. In this procedure, the participant that was seeking
to use the IMF's resources, which were to be supplemented for the purpose
by the proposed loans to the IMF, would not be able to cast its votes. A
member that seeks a stand-by arrangement or a transaction is not debarred
from having its votes cast when the IMF decides whether to comply with
the member's request.
In the negotiation of the First Amendment, a strenuous effort was made
to rescind the IMF's power of authoritative interpretation of the Articles.
The objection was advanced that weighted voting power was inappropriate
when interpretation was the issue, but the objection took account of the
125. Address by Henry C. Wallich to a meeting of the Institut for Wirtschaftsforschung,
at Hamburg (June 12, 1980).
126. SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 119-20.
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large proportion of the total voting power of all members that the United
States could cast. The outcome was a compromise that appears to be
unworkable.
The experience of the Eighth Quota Review 27 shows that change may
be difficult even when the Administration in the United States concludes
that a particular development in international monetary affairs that has the
support of other members is desirable. If legislation is necessary, the pro-
ject may be jeopardized by the diversity of interests, including domestic
political interests, among members of the U.S. Congress. The legislation
was obtained on this occasion by including provisions in it to tighten the
control of Congress over the Administration in a wide range of the IMF's
activities.128 Some of the instructions issued by Congress on the positions
that the Administration can or must take in the IMF are of dubious rele-
vance to the Articles of the IMF, and are not wholly consistent with each
other. The instructions are not directed toward the IMF itself and, there-
fore, were not the subject of international controversy or legal objection.
The contretemps has been described in the following vigorous
paragraphs in a speech delivered by Dr. Wallich on December 29, 1983:
On the other hand, the history of the passage of this legislation
through the Congress is bound to create deep concern for those inter-
ested in the international financial role of the United States. It is diffi-
cult to read this episode in any sense other than indicating a reduced
willingness of the American public to take an internationalist position
in financial and economic affairs. The legislation passed only with
great efforts, many compromises, and quite narrowly. It was loaded
down with a large number of provisions reflecting both domestic and
international political concerns. Provisions that might have affected
the smooth functioning of the international financial institutions were
barely avoided. Why, one must ask, is this happening at a time when
the United States economy is becoming increasingly open and inter-
dependent with the rest of the world? We were more internationally
oriented when our foreign sector was of the order of two to three per-
cent of GNP, as in the period following the creation of the Bretton
Woods institutions, than we are now when it has passed 10 percent.
Perhaps these difficulties could have been reduced had the legisla-
tion been presented in a different context and argued on less dramatic
grounds. This eighth IMF quota increase occurred at a time of diffi-
culties for developing countries and potentially for their creditors.
Perhaps inevitably this made crisis management the primary argu-
ment for the U.S. contribution. But, at the same time, this was a rou-
tine updating of the resources of the International Monetary Fund,
such as had occurred at regular five-year intervals, with a couple of
exceptions, since the founding of the institution. For the United
States to remain a member in good standing in an institution which it
had itself created and in which it still plays a leading role would seem
to be a persuasive argument. That the legislation preserved this U.S.
127. Id. at 376-85.
128. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153 (1983).
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role transcends in importance any other aspects.129
A leading role in the IMF for the United States may be preserved in the
sense that the quota of the United States has been increased, and approxi-
mately the same proportion of its voting power has been maintained. It is
too early to conclude that the legislation has limited the power of the U.S.
Administration to take progressive initiatives in the IMF or to support the
initiatives of others. The consequences of a hamstrung Administration
would be even more regrettable if the attitude of Congress that found ex-
pression in the new legislation indicates a hostility to international mone-
tary cooperation or to international organization in general. 130
Keynes was nervous about close control of the IMF by the U.S. Con-
gress, at least in the everyday activities of the IMF. In applauding the
creation of the U.S. National Advisory Council by the original Bretton
Woods Agreements Act, he wrote:
The Council has to report to Congress once a year and must keep
itself reasonably free from public criticism. But the idea and the hope
is that a considerable time can be allowed to pass before it has to go to
Congress again for any additional powers or additional finance. For
the first time the Administration possesses an organ for international
collaboration on economic and financial affairs which is relatively in-
dependent of Congress. That, for all of us, is a step forward, the im-
portance of which is not to be under-estimated.' 3'
Agreement on change has become more difficult to achieve not only be-
cause of the different interests of members but also because of the greater
dispersion of economic or financial power throughout the world. If change
requires amendment of the Articles, acceptance by high proportions of
members and voting power are required. The proportions were always
high, but the necessary proportion of total voting power was made even
higher by the Second Amendment, which increased the proportion from
eighty percent to eighty-five percent. A motive for this change was to al-
low the United States to consent to increases in its quota under which its
proportion of voting power would fall below twenty percent without loss
of a veto over proposed amendments.
The effect of the acceptances required for amendments is that many
groups of members can prevent proposals from coming into force. The
United States remains the only member that can exercise a veto without
the support of other members. The tendency of groups of other members
to coalesce in reaching positions has grown over the years. Numerous
combinations have come into existence. Developing countries, oil-export-
ing countries, the Group of Ten, members of the European Community,
the five members whose currencies compose the SDR basket, and the
seven members that attend Summit Meetings do not exhaust the combina-
129. Speech delivered by Henry C. Wallich (Dec. 29, 1983).
130. See, e.g., Friedman: Dismantle the IMF, J. COM., Oct. 13, 1983, at A6.
131. 26 KEYNES, supra note 30, at 233 (footnote omitted).
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tions. A complex interweaving of interests means that numerous and
sometimes labyrinthine compromises are a practical necessity.
It is unlikely that an amendment to give effect to a single idea, however
desirable it may be in the interest of all members, can be negotiated with-
out provoking further proposals by some members. The First Amendment
can be cited to rebut this presumption. The creation of the SDR was bene-
ficial to all members, but developing members saw less benefit to them in
the project. Allocations would be made at the same rate in proportion to
quotas, and the quotas of developing members were modest or tiny. These
members were more disposed to negotiate benefits in relation to the use of
the IMF's resources. Developing members made proposals for this
purpose.
The effect of rejection of these proposals was to create a determination
on the part of developing members that the experience would not be re-
peated. They formed the Group of Twenty-Four in order to reach unified
positions. Developed countries were shamefaced about the high-handed
treatment that they had given developing countries and regretful that
political animosity had been provoked. The Outline of Reform of the
Committee of Twenty shows a different, and remarkable, change of atti-
tude to the interests of developing members. The new attitude was appar-
ent in the negotiation and drafting of the Second Amendment.
Developing members are not powerful enough to ensure an automatic re-
action in their favor, but they will be aware of their strategic strength in
the negotiation of any further amendments of the Articles.
The need for compromise as a complication of, and even a deterrent to,
proposals for change is not confined to amendment. A similar difficulty
faces proposals for evolution under the powers conferred on the IMF by
the Second Amendment. The original Articles were drafted on the as-
sumption that a charter had been completed for the international mone-
tary system, and great changes in it were not foreseen as likely. This
assumption may be one reason why the requirements for amendment were
so severe. The spirit in which the Articles were negotiated was that the
everyday operation of the IMF should be as efficient as possible. This
spirit meant that only for a few decisions of the IMF would a special ma-
jority be necessary. The basic majority of the votes cast would suffice for
the adoption of most decisions, because that majority would be least likely
to permit the obstruction of proposals for action by the IMF. The United
States took the lead in advocating minimal reliance on special majorities,
perhaps in the confidence that its predominant power in the world would
be sufficient assurance of respect for its views.
A different spirit among some other members appeared in the negotia-
tion of the First Amendment. European members were fearful that exces-
sive allocations of SDRs would be made and that European members
would be designated by the IMF as the recipients of SDRs when transfers
of them were made by other members. This fear was reminiscent of
White's objection to the creation of bancor as proposed by Keynes. The
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six members of the European Community at that time had achieved so
strong a balance of payments and reserve position that the IMF had sold a
greater total of their currencies than of U.S. dollars in the transactions of
the IMF. A majority of eighty-five percent of the total voting power would
give these members a veto over proposals to allocate SDRs and some other
crucial decisions in the operation of the new scheme. The novelty of that
scheme was a strong argument in favor of so high a majority, and eighty-
five percent became the rule not only for a number of decisions relating to
SDRs, but also for other decisions affecting official liquidity.
The development that had occurred on the occasion of the First Amend-
ment was carried to an extreme length by the Second Amendment. A vast
increase took place in the number of decisions for which a special majority
becomes necessary. Many motives existed for the choice of the categories
of decisions for which special majorities are now required. 32 Two expla-
nations of a general character can be adduced. First, many of the powers
that can be exercised by decisions taken with a special majority involve an
evolutionary process. Some of the powers are substitutes for the agree-
ment that could not be reached on proposals advanced in the negotiation
of the Amendment. Second, special majorities recognize the need for com-
promises on evolution of the international monetary system in modern
conditions.
When the Second Amendment was drafted, the opportunity was taken
to reduce the number of different special majorities to two: eighty-five per-
cent and seventy percent of the total voting power. The assignment of the
higher or the lower majority to a category of decisions was not made with
total logic. A distinction between decisions of evolutionary impact and
operational decisions was observed as a rough criterion.
The higher majority gives an obvious veto to many groups of members,
including developing countries, but the lower majority also gives develop-
ing countries a veto. A proposed decision, therefore, may provoke propos-
als for compensating benefits. Once again, the proposal of a Substitution
Account provides an example: "[T]he developing countries announced po-
tential demands as a condition for agreeing to the use of the IMF's gold to
bridge at least in part any potential interest and capital deficit in the ac-
count."' 133 From time to time, some members have expressed dissatisfac-
tion with a majority that gives a single member a veto. The United States
has a veto when eighty-five percent of the total voting power is required
for a decision. The United States, speaking through its National Advisory
Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, has explained
its attitude to special majorities. This expression of viewpoint is of particu-
lar interest in relation to exchange rates:
The second, and closely related point, is that the system of voting
majorities in the Fund will be revised considerably under the
132. J. GOLD, VOTING MAJORITIES IN THE FUND: EFFECTS OF SECOND AMENDMENT OF
THE ARTICLES (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 20, 1977).
133. Address by Henry C. Wallich, supra note 125.
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amended Articles. Throughout the negotiations, the United States
has taken a supportive but very cautious approach in the effort to
make the Articles more adaptable to changing future needs. Thus a
number of decisions which either are not authorized under the present
Articles, or are authorized to be taken by lower majorities, have been
made subject to a majority of eighty-five percent of the total voting
power. This assures the United States and other countries that impor-
tant changes of policy in the Fund will not be implemented unless
they command wide support; and, in particular, the United States will
be assured that it will have the ability to forestall any important policy
decision which it considers to be against the interests of the United
States or of the system as a whole. 134
These new exchange rate provisions are of critical importance both
for the system as a whole and for the United States. They focus on
the essential need to achieve underlying stability in economic affairs if
exchange stability is to be achieved. They provide a flexible frame-
work for the evolution of exchange arrangements consistent with this
broad focus. And they help to ensure that the United States is not
again forced into the position of maintaining a value for its currency
that is out of line with underlying competitive realities and that costs
the United States jobs and growth due to loss of exports, increased
imports and a shift of production facilities overseas. Under the new
provisions, the United States will have a controlling voice in the fu-
ture adoption of general exchange arrangements for the system as a
whole; and will have full freedom in the selection of exchange ar-
rangements to be applied by the United States, regardless of the gen-
eral arrangements adopted, so long as it meets its general IMF
obligations.135
XIII. A CONCLUDING COMMENT
Pessimistic views have been expressed on the possibilities for a firmer
and broader rule of law on exchange rates and on other aspects of interna-
tional monetary relations. Some views have been based on the hypothesis
that such a development is necessary but insufficient. The interdepen-
dence of countries makes it impossible for them to pursue independent
policies in either external or domestic monetary matters. Countries are
affected by both the external and the domestic policies of other countries.
International monetary reform alone would not be successful, because it
would not touch domestic policies.
Given the non-independence of nations' domestic as well as external
policies, restriction of international cooperation to the area of ex-
change rates and external reserve positions is bound to be analytically
unsound. The difficulties can be especially great if an attempt is made
134. SPECIAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS ON AMENDMENT OF
THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND ON AN IN-
CREASE IN QUOTAS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 20 (1976).
135. Id. at 23.
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to impose a tightly drafted supranational rule of law pertaining exclu-
sively to the international monetary system.
Should national governments be urged to develop such a compre-
hensive rule of law for the world economy and to subject their domes-
tic policy actions to corresponding enforcement responsibilities of
supranational institutions? A sufficient reason for rejecting thai rec-
ommendation is its obvious impracticality. Despite the economic in-
terdependence that undermines their sovereignty de facto, national
governments are politically unable to take major steps to cede a sub-
stantial part of their sovereignty de jure.136
The conclusion of the author of this statement rests on the assumption
that rules of law must be rigid or mechanistic in their operation. His pref-
erence is for the development of cooperative and discretionary decision-
making about national macroeconomic policies, accompanied by a corre-
sponding evolution of national and supranational institutions to promote
the interdependence on which this preference is based.
It may be that in international economic relations all that can be hoped
for in the coming years is "soft law" and more elaborate procedures for
consultation, 137 and that firm law will be the work of generations. 138 An-
other economist, Alan Greenspan, has said, "better is better than not bet-
ter."'139 Discussing economic laws, one scholar has written:
It is also obvious that the type of rules which we have been discussing,
although they are unquestionably rules of binding law, have in no
way the character of religious commandments, laid down absolutely,
obeyed rigidly and integrally. The rules here described are essentially
elastic and adjustable, leaving a considerable latitude within which
their fulfilment is regarded as satisfactory. 140
The author was the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, and he was dis-
cussing the economic laws of Melanesia. The analogy between savage so-
ciety, as he called it, and the family of nations needs no emphasis.
136. R. BRYANT, FINANCIAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND VARIABILITY IN EXCHANGE
RATES: A STAFF PAPER 22-23 (1980).
137. McCulloch, Unexpected Real Consequences of Floating Exchange Rates, in ESSAYS
IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 20 (No. 153, 1983) ("[I]ntemational political realities pre-
cluded the 'choice' or 'design' of a new system. Perhaps Bretton Woods was a unique phe-
nomenon, at least for modem times.").
138. Widman, Monetary Reform Requires Political Overhaul, J. COM., Mar. 3, 1983, at
A4, col. 6 ("The shock of returning to economic isolationism would destroy free societies as
surely as continued economic recession. Radical revisions of present policies which increase
the power of supranational authority are the changes of generations. For now what we need
is the maximum degree of economic policy coordination which can be achieved within the
prevailing political framework.")
139. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1983, § S3, at 12; cf. 26 KEYNES, supra note 30, at 2-3 ("[T]he
underlying truth, namely that none of these schemes will ever be accepted for their own
beautiful eyes or special merits, but because as soon as one faces the probable alternative it
is obviously so much worse.").




EXCHANGE RATES AND SOVEREIGNTY UNDER H.D. WHITE'S
STABILIZATION FUND
It will perhaps help toward understanding and induce a more sympa-
thetic approach to the proposals which follow to state at the outset that
something much more than the usual banking and stabilization functions
are envisaged in the plan. There is urgent need for instruments which will
pave the way and make easy a high degree of cooperation and collabora-
tion among the United Nations in economic fields hitherto held too sacro-
sanct for international action or multilateral sovereignty. A breach must
be made and widened in the outmoded and disastrous economic policy of
each-country-for-itself-and-the-devil-take-the-weakest. Just as the failure
to develop an effective League of Nations has made possible two devastat-
ing wars within one generation, so the absence of a high degree of eco-
nomic collaboration among the leading nations will, during the coming
decade, inevitably result in economic warfare that will be but the prelude
and instigator of military warfare on an even vaster scale.'
4
'
The circumstances under which it may be wise to alter an exchange rate
in order to correct maladjustments of the balance of payments have long
been a matter of controversy among monetary theorists. But there is gen-
eral agreement that an alteration in the value of a currency in terms of
gold (or in terms of important currencies) is a very serious business and
one not to be undertaken lightly. The change in the value of a currency in
terms of gold or other currencies means that a change has by that act been
imposed on the other currencies. When, for example, the dollar changes in
terms of sterling, obviously sterling changes in terms of the dollar. Be-
cause all countries are to a lesser or greater degree affected by the action of
any one country with respect to the value of its currency, it is only reason-
able to demand that such action should not be undertaken without care-
ful-and, if possible, impartial-weighing of the consequences of the
action on other countries.
The purpose of requiring approval by the Fund as a condition of altera-
tion of currency is to assure joint consideration of the merits of the pro-
posed action and thereby avoid unilateral action taken to obtain presumed
competitive short-run advantages irrespective of the consequences of the
impact of the step on other countries or even on the same country. The
mere fact that membership would be forfeited if a country acted in so im-
portant a matter contrary to the wishes of the majority would make coun-
tries hesitate to undertake lightly a change in their currency. The very
discussion of the problem by competent representatives of various coun-
tries should in itself be a potent influence to avoid unnecessary changes. It
would, moreover, be an assurance that when a change is made it would not
be a signal for numerous other countries to follow in their own real or
presumed interest . . ..
141. 3 J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 7, at 40.
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Some objection to this requirement will doubtless be raised on the
ground that such a provision means that other countries pass judgment on
what is a domestic monetary matter. The necessity for obtaining approval
of other countries on such a matter will be regarded in some quarters as a
serious infringement of sovereignty. There is some measure of truth in this
but hardly enough to constitute a decisive reason for not participating in
the Fund. Alteration of a currency affects other countries as well as the
country making the change. It is, therefore, only reasonable to demand
that the other countries have some say in the decision. Furthermore, all
members would be surrendering their "rights" to an equal extent. Unless
nations are willing to sacrifice some of their power to take unilateral action
in matters of international economic relations, there is very little hope of
any significant international cooperation-let alone collaboration.
To avoid giving richer nations greater authority on such matters, by vir-
tue of their larger number of votes, it may be desirable to give each partici-
pant only one vote when questions of altering currency rates are being
voted upon. As a last resort, a country always has the choice of withdraw-
ing from the Fund so that it can always preserve its sovereignty in mone-
tary matters if it feels it is being prevented by the Fund from taking action
deemed important to its own interest.
The principle worked only tolerably well in the Tripartite Accord during
1935, 1936 and 1937, and better machinery for more adequate discussion
and greater willingness to recognize the legitimate interests of other coun-
tries, needs to be developed to achieve best results. In evaluating the need
for collaboration on questions of foreign exchange rates, it is well to re-
member that unilateral action can easily be neutralized by similar action
on the part of other countries. When a competitive advantage is sought it
is essential if it is to be successful that other countries do not take similar
action. Otherwise the advantage hoped for is lost. Where the chief objec-
tive sought is not a competitive trade advantage in the international mar-
ket but modification of the domestic price structure or money market, the
favorable effects cannot be wholly negated by action of other countries.
Since, however, the chief reason for establishing the requirement is to
avoid competitive depreciation of currencies, the fact that unilateral action
can be easily neutralized constitutes an important argument for securing
approval of the Fund before taking such action.1 42
APPENDIX B
KEYNES ON DISCRETIONARY POWERS
Proposalsfor an International Currency (or Clearing) Union
Perhaps the most difficult question to determine is how much to decide by
rule and how much to leave to discretion. If rule prevails, the liabilities
attaching to membership of the system are definite, whilst the responsibili-
ties of central management are reduced to a minimum. On the other hand,
142. Id. at 65-66.
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liabilities which would require the surrender by legislation of too much of
the discretion, normally inherent in a Government, will not be readily un-
dertaken by ourselves or by the United States. If discretion prevails, how
far can the ultimate decision be left to the individual members and how far
to the central management? If the individual members are too free, indis-
cipline may result and unwarrantable liberties be taken. But if it is to the
central management that the discretions are given, too heavy a weight of
responsibility may rest on it, and it may be assuming the exercise of pow-
ers which it has not the strength to implement. If rule prevails, the scheme
can be made more water-tight theoretically. But if discretion prevails, it
may work better in practice. All this is the typical problem of any super-
national authority. An earlier draft of this proposal was criticized for lean-
ing too much to the side of rule. In the provisions below the bias is in the
other direction. For it may be better not to attempt to settle too much
beforehand and to provide that the plan shall be reconsidered after an
initial experimental period of (say) five years. Only by collective wisdom
and discussion can the right compromise be reached between law and
license. 143
Report to U.K. Ministers (February 7, 1944)
17. In the course of discussion, however, the American representatives
were persuaded of the inacceptability of such a scheme of things, of the
undesirability of starting off by giving so much authority to an untried
institution, and of the importance of giving the member countries as much
certainty as possible about what they had to expect from the new institu-
tion and about the amount of facilities which would be at their full dispo-
sal. In the final draft, therefore, all the technical matters at issue, except
one, have been in the end settled on the expert level.
18. The one matter outstanding which flows from an initial difference
of approach by the Clearing Union and by the Stabilisation Fund respec-
tively, is as follows. Under the Clearing Union proposals the member
countries were to bank with the institution, where they would have ac-
counts on which they were free to operate in terms of a new international
unit of account, to be called bancor. Under the Stabilisation Fund propos-
als the institution was to bank with the member countries, holding ac-
counts with their central banks on which it would be free to operate in
terms of each member's currency, so that no new international unit would
be necessary. An international money of account, unitas, was mentioned
in the Stabilisation Fund proposals but was only mentioned to be forgotten
and played no effective part. Now this difference, however important, is
nevertheless only a matter of technical form. A given set of proposals can
be drafted in terms of either set-up so as to be identical in substance and
legal effect. 144
143. Id. at 6.
144. 25 KEYNES, supra note 21, at 404-05.
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